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Reply to the Attn of: Chief Health and Medical Office
TO: Senior Advisor for Health and Medical Policy
FROM: Chief Engineer
 Chief Safety and Mission Assurance
 Chief Health and Medical Officer
SUBJECT: Human Systems Integration
Effective human systems integration has perennially posed great challenges across the
spectrum of human-rated vehicle design, development, and operations. Examples of
suboptimal human system integration are numerous across the maritime, rail, and aviation
industries. In human space flight vehicles, effective human system integration is critical due
to the constant threat and unforgiving nature of the launch, in-space, and re-entry/recovery
environments. In long-duration exploration-class missions, the in-space phase will be even
more unforgiving, with little to no chance for recovery or return in the event of system
malfunction or failure. Mission success and the lives of the crew will be dependent on
reliable systems that are optimal from the earliest phases of design through development.
We would like you to form a cross-discip1ine team to examine differences in culture and
practice between the engineering, life sciences, and medical communities. Some of the
challenges and failures of human systems integration may be due to problems with
communication and cooperation between these communities, each of whom must perform
well together for successful design, development, and operations of human-rated
spacecraft. Improvement in human systems integration may result from increased cross- 
cultural understanding and better working relationships between these professional
disciplines.
Please submit a report to the NASA Technical Authorities with your observations and any
recommendations for HSI improvement by July 2017. We look forward to seeing the
progress your team will make with this difficult task.
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Executive Summary
The current “Rosetta Stone” project draws its analogy to the original ancient 
carved rock decree, engraved in three distinct lexicons to be understood 
within the context of one another. With this idea in mind, this project was 
undertaken to examine similarities and differences in culture and practice 
between engineering, life sciences, and health and medical disciplines in the 
context of human systems integration (HSI).
The successful design, development, and operation of human-rated sys-
tems for space flight requires the combined efforts of engineering, science, 
and human health disciplines. Each of these disciplines contributes a differ-
ent set of scientific and technical expertise in addressing the challenges of 
planning, designing, and operating safely and successfully in the environ-
ment of space. HSI can be defined as an interdisciplinary and comprehen-
sive management and technical process that focuses on the integration of 
human considerations into the system acquisition and development processes 
to enhance human system design, reduce life-cycle ownership cost, and opti-
mize total system performance. The implementation of HSI is challenging 
and often fraught with problems. HSI must play an integral and active role 
in the development of spacecraft and high-performance aircraft. This role 
must address considerations related to health and safety of the operators and 
passengers. Complex systems that are not human-rated, operated directly 
or remotely by humans, must also undergo the HSI process for full success.
The primary goal of the project was to identify and understand differences 
and to make recommendations for improving the ability of the communities 
to work together more effectively to improve HSI and systems operations. 
Notable examples of HSI failures in aviation and space vehicles are provided. 
The complexities of human-machine interfaces are examined from behavioral 
health and human factors perspectives. Differences in the ways that engineers, 
life scientists, and physicians approach problem evaluation and solving are 
described. Additionally, an innovative approach to human health risk evalu-
ation using sets of ethical principles and responsibilities to guide decision-
making in extraordinary risk acceptance is described in detail.
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NASA has implemented engineering, safety and mission assurance, and 
health and medical technical authority as part of its checks-and-balances 
systems to work with program management. The manuscript describes some 
of the challenges facing technical authority implementation, especially in 
the field of health and medicine. NASA life scientists and medical person-
nel recognized the imperative of effective communication with engineering 
program management years ago and took steps to improve their ability to 
communicate with engineering colleagues. 
The NASA health and medical system was reconfigured to an occupa-
tional health model (risk-based standards to requirements to deliverables) to 
optimize astronaut health. The NASA Human Research Program (HRP) 
was integral to these changes, prioritizing its research agenda to address 
health risk requirements and using system engineering–like tools to com-
municate with NASA leadership and management. Experts in the HRP have 
adapted probabilistic risk assessment, a major engineering risk assessment 
tool, to health and medical risks in human space flight in the form of the 
Integrated Medical Model (IMM). 
The IMM is an innovative tool that expresses medical risk in quantita-
tive terms that are relatable to engineers and interpretable by the engineering 
community and may also have wide value beyond the realm of human space 
flight. Human factors experts and other experts in HSI have produced the 
HSI Practitioners Guide, which provides phase-by-phase guidance for HSI 
activities and products and has been adopted by NASA’s foremost human 
spacecraft development projects.
This document summarizes the differences in the medical/life sciences 
and engineering communities of practice, beginning with the substrate on 
which each community works, continuing through professional lexicon, 
risk analysis and identification, to risk remediation and problem resolution. 
Cultural and practical bridges need to be built between the communities of 
practice responsible for the design, development, and operation of human-
occupied and -operated systems. The following are recommendations for 
improving communication and understanding between engineering and 
medical/life sciences communities:
1. Recognize the fact that significant cultural differences between com-
munities of practice (i.e., life sciences and medicine) involved in NASA 
system development and operations exist. These cultural differences 
pose a risk to effective HSI.
2. Address cultural differences, primarily between engineering and medi-
cal/life sciences communities, early in the career paths of practitioners. 
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Given the importance of human-rated and -operated systems, not just 
to NASA but also across society, these differences should be formally 
addressed in the early training curricula of both engineering and medi-
cal/life sciences students in their respective professional schools. 
3. Develop a common lexicon and common means of communication, 
methods, and practices that are recognizable and understandable by 
all, as effective communication is imperative. In NASA, the Technical 
Authorities and the Mission Directorates should collaborate to produce 
training modules in NASA’s learning management system—System for 
Administration, Training, and Educational Resources (SATERN)—to 
promote understanding of cultural differences and improve dynam-
ics and the working relationship between engineering and medical/
life sciences communities. NASA should also establish a mandate for 
the Technical Authorities to emphasize effective HSI and to mediate 
and translate between the medical/life sciences and engineering com-
munities. Medical/life sciences communities should leverage com-
munication techniques used widely in systems engineering as much 
as possible. Medical/life sciences communities should utilize engineer-
ing risk analysis techniques when feasible. Engineering communities 
would be well served to formally consider specific, defined ethical 
principles and responsibilities when evaluating overall risk assessment 
and acceptance. The field of human factors is critically important as 
common ground for the intersection of all communities of practice in 
HSI and can serve as an effective agent and venue for change.
4. Create an imperative that all members of these diverse and relevant 
communities work together in a common platform to ensure the 
health and safety of the crewmember and the entire system that sup-
ports them from design and construction to operation. The diversity of 
thought/perspectives from each of the relevant communities is a neces-
sity in order to have successful systems, and as such, those diverse con-
tributions must be actively engaged, encouraged, and respected. Such 
a paradigm is critical in human space flight as it enters a new phase of 
deep space and planetary exploration.
5. Recognize that dynamic tension exists between Technical Authorities 
and program/project management. This tension is healthy in the vast 
majority of cases and is laudatory for its value in enhancing safety 
and the overall project/program success. Serious conflicts can arise, 
however, when differences of opinion between technical authori-
ties and program managers potentially affect budgets and schedules. 
Firm organizational commitment to fully vetting all opinions, with 
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senior leadership cognizance of and authority over final decisions, is 
imperative.
6. Engage the National Academies of Engineering, Science, and Medicine 
to study and comment on the imperative of cross-community collab-
oration and communication in HSI. This study could be facilitated 
by the Committee on Aerospace Medicine and Medicine of Extreme 
Environments and the Board on Human System Integration.
7. Study the disparate ways in which human factors and HSI are orga-
nized and addressed throughout NASA. Disconnects between require-
ments “ownership” and workforce management from center to center 
and directorate to directorate might contribute to the HSI challenges 
currently faced. A multidisciplinary team to fully study organizational 
challenges to effective HSI should be chartered.
8. Inclusion of all responsible and relevant communities of practice in all 
phases of the project/program, from design to operations, is absolutely 
necessary. Inclusion of communities late in the process has demonstra-
bly untoward and sometimes tragic effects.
9. The ethics-based decision-making framework that has been imple-
mented for health and medical risks should also be considered for use 
in other risk acceptance paradigms. The same ethical principles and 
responsibilities could be applied to risk analysis, mitigation and accep-
tance in the safety and engineering realms as well. This would provide a 
broader context for risk decision-making and result in a stronger foun-
dation to support the acceptance of higher risk levels, particularly in 
situations where mitigation strategies are inadequate or not available. 
Incorporation of a formal role for ethical considerations in engineering 
and safety risk analysis and decision-making could ultimately result in 
more comprehensive mission planning and management.
10. Finally, stress the importance of organizational leadership in achieving 
successful HSI. Ultimately, effective HSI is clearly a leadership respon-
sibility. Communication and understanding between diverse commu-
nities of practice must be inculcated as an organizational core value, 
repeatedly emphasized by leadership as an imperative.
The engineering, safety, life sciences, and health and medical communi-
ties have an obligation to work together as collaboratively as possible in the 
processes of HSI. As we move away from Earth in exploration-class mis-
sions, this effort becomes even more important. We will not have the ability 
to abort missions and return to Earth, and repair/remediation of systems 
failures will be supremely challenging to impossible. The health, well-being, 
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and survival of our exploration crews depends on successful synergy of the 
engineering, life sciences, and medical communities of practice at the earliest 
stages of design.
The chapters in this manuscript have been written by subject matter 
experts that have years of experience in all three disciplines as they relate to 
human space flight. The editors and authors sincerely hope that this manu-
script proves useful in improving that synergy.
Richard S. Williams, MD, MPH
Charles R. Doarn, MBA
Madison Oxford
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The Perennial Challenge of Human Systems 
Integration: Failures, Compromises, and the 
Effectiveness of Lessons Learned
Charles R. Doarn, MBA; Thomas W. Travis, MD, MPH; Madison Oxford;  
Nancy J. Currie-Gregg, PhD; and Arnauld E. Nicogossian, MD
Abstract: The successful design, development, and operation of human-rated 
and -operated systems requires the combined effort of engineering, science, 
and human health disciplines. Each of these disciplines produces uniquely 
trained experts who approach their fields differently from fundamental work 
to applied practices. Human Systems Integration (HSI) is an important and 
vital step in the development of human-rated spacecraft and high-perfor-
mance aircraft. The three disciplines of engineering, life sciences, and health/
medicine are critical disciplines that must engage with one another to ensure 
the health and safety of the operator. They must also include anthropomet-
ric involvement of male and female operators who are integrated into these 
systems or interact with them. This chapter presents some of the failures, 
compromises, and lessons learned in the complex field of HSI. These les-
sons illustrate only a few examples of how HSI is required in the design of 
complex systems and how its success ensures overall crew and mission safety 
and success.
Keywords: medicine, engineering, complex systems, integration, human 
factors, HSI, conflict resolution
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Introduction
In the realm of aerospace engineering and the physical sciences, we have 
developed laws of physics based on empirical and research evidence that reli-
ably guide design, research, and development efforts. For instance, an engi-
neer designs a system based on data and experience that can be consistently 
and repeatedly verified. This reproducibility depends on the consistency and 
dependability of the materials on which the engineer works and is subject to 
physics, geometry, and convention. In life sciences and medicine, these apply 
as well, but individuality introduces a host of variables into the mix, resulting 
in characteristics and outcomes that can be quite broad within a population 
of individuals. This individuality ranges from differences at the genetic and 
cellular level to differences in an individual’s personality and abilities due to 
sex and gender, environment, education, etc.
This human variability presents a daunting challenge to engineers and 
program managers, who are unfamiliar with, and therefore uncomfortable, 
addressing the individual or “soft” side of systems development. It used to be 
thought that “technology + concept of operations = capability”. Recognizing 
the importance of the human in the system, this equation could be modi-
fied to this: “(technology + concept of operation) × (human) = capability”, 
where the human in the system becomes a multiplier. Effective human-sys-
tems integration (HSI) begins with the acknowledgment that the human is a 
critical component that must be considered throughout the design and oper-
ational life cycle of any complex system. This includes factors such as person-
nel selection, training, and health/fitness requirements for designated tasks. 
If a system is designed with HSI as a critical component, then the human 
in the system is better equipped to operate it safely and minimize impact on 
health and safety. Conversely, to neglect the human, or short-change HSI 
in program trade-offs without full awareness of the risk due to requirement 
deficiencies or lack of expertise, is to put both the humans and the craft in 
peril, and lifecycle costs for a sustained system may greatly increase. 
Challenges and Opportunities
The strength of steel or steel alloys and the flow of fuel into a rocket engine 
are measured with precision and accuracy. Engineering principles and natu-
ral law permit systems to be built that can support the stated objectives—a 
bridge, spacecraft, a new flight suit, etc. When you introduce humans into 
this engineering paradigm, everything changes. The “engineered” system 
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must now incorporate requirements accommodating human variability that 
will ensure crew health and safety. Figure 1.1 illustrates the complexity of 
the interface of the Orion crew capsule. The requirements of any human-
rated system must be fully vetted by an inclusive team of subject matter 
experts, including those individuals dealing with human factors and crew 
health and safety, at the project onset. The vetting should also include test 
flights to validate system design.
Figure 1.1. Orion capsule. (NASA)
An engineer will design and build a great system to the requirements 
that he or she is given, and the system will work. However, there have been 
numerous examples of human-rated systems where requirements have been 
incomplete or inappropriate, with problematic or even fatal consequences to 
the human crew and loss of the vehicle. For example, in the 1990s, in order 
to drive down costs of procuring new systems, requirements were written in 
a way that relied on contractors to meet less prescriptive “total system perfor-
mance requirements.” As a result, credible life science or medical expertise 
inputs to contractors could too easily be dismissed or not even sought. In 
one particular aircraft acquisition program during this time, recommenda-
tions to better support the safety and performance of the aircrew were not 
incorporated for the sake of schedule, cost, and weight, with some acknowl-
edgment of risk. Years later, related concerns grounded the fleet, impact-
ing the confidence in the system and operations. As a result, some of the 
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recommendations previously dismissed during development had to be engi-
neered into the system after very public discussions of the issue and at a 
significantly greater cost. 
 A human-centered design approach seeks to integrate the humans into 
the engineering of the system by accounting for prospective user population 
physical and cognitive capabilities and limitations. Women in traditionally 
male-dominated occupations may face sex-specific challenges. Many of these 
challenges are introduced unintentionally by equipment and/or tasks that 
are inconsistent with female anthropometry and capabilities. To ensure the 
health and safety of male and female astronauts during space missions, it 
is imperative to understand the potential influences of sex and gender on 
space systems design and operations. “Sex” and “gender” are often used 
interchangeably, but they are not synonymous terms. “Sex’’ is defined as the 
classification of male or female according to an individual’s genetics, and 
‘‘gender’’ refers to a person’s self-representation as male or female based upon 
social interactions.
Spacecraft and space habitats to support human exploration missions 
must employ a human-centered design approach to ensure both crew safety 
and mission success. As identified by NASA’s Human Research Program 
(HRP), incompatible vehicle/habitat design is recognized as a potential risk 
to human health and performance during space operations. As stated in the 
HRP’s Evidence Report for this risk, “Given that vehicle, habitat, and work-
space designs must accommodate variations in human physical characteris-
tics and capabilities, and given that the duration of crew habitation in these 
space-based environments will be far greater than missions of the past, there 
is a risk of acute and chronic ergonomic-related disorders, resulting in flight 
and ground crew errors and inefficiencies, failed mission and program objec-
tives, and an increase in the potential for crew injuries.” 
Human-system interfaces in vehicles and habitats must consider a crew-
member’s physical and cognitive performance capabilities and limitations, 
including effects of micro- and/or partial-gravity conditions; dynamic and 
sustained accelerations; vibrations; atmospheric makeup, etc.; and other 
potentially deleterious environmental factors, such as noise, lighting, and vis-
ibility. An important factor in the identification of crewmember performance 
capabilities and limitations is the definition and selection of the appropriate 
reference crew population. 
Ergonomic considerations are a critical element in spacecraft and space 
habitat design and development to ensure that human performance capa-
bilities and limitations are considered for all vehicle systems requiring crew 
interaction. Anthropometric criteria for spacecraft and space habitats should 
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attempt to maximize accommodation of both male and female populations. 
It is also imperative for astronaut selection criteria to be consistent with design 
standards and requirements for spacecraft and critical crew equipment. This 
has not always been the case. A study conducted in 2002 revealed gaps in 
accommodating the anthropometric range of members of the U.S. Astronaut 
Corps for almost every system that crewmembers were required to interface 
with, either in training or during space flight. Systems, which did not prop-
erly accommodate all astronauts eligible for flight assignments, included the 
launch and entry suit (LES), the extravehicular mobility units (EMU), Space 
Shuttle seats, Soyuz seats, Russian Orlan suits, and T-38 ejection seats. See 
Figure 1.2. Smaller female crewmembers were particularly affected, result-
ing in a substantial number of female astronauts ineligible for Space Station 
expedition assignment. In other cases, this incompatibility was considered a 
“waiverable” condition, which resulted in the affected crewmembers incur-
ring some undefined, incremental risk of catastrophic injury. 
Figure 1.2. Astronaut Nancy Currie-Gregg  
in the LES aboard the Shuttle. (NASA)
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When interpreting anthropometric data, a single measurement or per-
centile is not representative of a crewmember and should not be used exclu-
sively. Rather, it is important for human factors engineers to work with 
system designers to identify critical anthropometric dimensions for specific 
system operations and crew functions. For example, there is a relatively small 
set of anthropometric dimensions considered critical for EMU design, such 
as chest breadth and biceps circumference. Population analysis can then be 
used to determine the range of accommodation, usability, and operability 
within the context of the targeted user population. 
The following is an example of how subsequent changes to a vehicle 
design can lead to human-systems integration issues, particularly with 
respect to anthropometric differences between males and females. Following 
the Space Shuttle Challenger accident, a new method for crew escape was 
implemented for scenarios in which the Orbiter was in controlled flight but 
unable to successfully reach a runway. This escape system, manually acti-
vated by a flight crewmember in the middeck of the Orbiter’s crew compart-
ment, relied on deployment of, and attachment to, an escape pole, which 
helped guide crewmembers clear of the orbiter’s wing. Implementation of 
the escape system enacted requirements for crewmembers to wear a pres-
sure suit during launch and entry. The suit selected was similar to those 
worn by high-altitude pilots in the U.S. military and built to anthropometric 
specifications to accommodate the American male military aviator popula-
tion. Female anthropometric measurements are typically smaller than male 
measurements; however, the major exception to this generalization is hip 
breadth—average female hip breadth exceeds that of males. Shortly after 
the use of pressure suits was introduced, it became apparent that suit cooling 
to maintain the crew’s core body temperature within prescribed limits was 
necessary. After failed attempts to achieve the desired level of cooling using 
forced air, a liquid cooling garment was fielded. By the mid-1990s, the LES 
ensemble included not only the pressure suit but also a thick diaper, a G-suit, 
and a liquid cooling garment. All these additional accoutrements increased 
the hip breadth by approximately eight inches and served to further exacer-
bate a pre-existing issue with females attempting to fit into a suit designed 
to accommodate the hip breadth of the male population. Ultimately, many 
female astronauts were outfitted with a larger size pressure suit, simply to 
accommodate their hip breadth. In the event of failure scenarios, which 
caused the suit to pressurize, this could lead to issues with visibility and 
manual dexterity, which potentially could, in turn, affect crew performance.
The National Academy of Sciences’ decadal survey in 2011 emphasized 
the need to examine and understand the influences that sex and gender have 
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on physiological, psychological, or behavioral changes that occur during 
space flight. In response, NASA has focused on identifying cardiovascular, 
immunological, sensorimotor, musculoskeletal, reproductive and behavioral 
implications on space flight adaptation for both men and women. However, 
continued research concerning sex-specific physiological differences, includ-
ing differences in responses to prolonged exposure to microgravity, is vital to 
enhance understanding of how these differences may affect mission success 
and/or crew health and safety. 
One noted difference affecting female astronauts is that women may be 
at a higher risk for radiation damage than men, which could ultimately result 
in more restrictions for long-duration mission participation. Thus, radiation 
shielding technologies and techniques should be explored in order to equally 
accommodate both sexes. Female astronauts may also be more susceptible to 
orthostatic intolerance, which may affect their ability to self-egress following 
spacecraft landings if mitigations, such as properly fitting G-suits, are not 
provided. Women also tend to experience more adverse drug reactions than 
do males, and insufficient research and knowledge of safe dosing for women 
has led to accidental overmedication. Another safety concern is radio com-
munication between the sexes, because men’s ability to hear high pitches 
degrades with age, and female voices tend to be higher pitched, leading to 
potential communication issues between crewmembers or between the crew 
and ground controllers. 
Within the past few years occupant protection standards have been 
developed and incorporated into Human-System Integration Requirements 
(HSIR) for both NASA and Commercial Crew Program spacecraft. Injury 
risk functions based on anthropomorphic test device (ATD) responses and 
Injury Assessment Risk Values (IARVs) have been developed for both 5th-
percentile females and 95th-percentile males. However, additional research 
is needed to determine differences between male and female physiological 
responses to dynamic accelerations, such as those incurred during spacecraft 
capsule landings, which can result in crew injury. One reason for this knowl-
edge gap is that the majority of the datasets used to determine biodynamic 
limits for injury prevention, such as those from the U.S. military, are primar-
ily based on male subjects. Recently, research on sex differences with respect 
to biodynamic responses to dynamic accelerations has been conducted by the 
automotive and military sectors. However, this sex-specific research has not 
been transformed into appropriate sex-specific injury risk limits for human 
space flight, and further study is needed. 
The following section provides several specific examples of inadequate or 
faulty HSI that led to compromise or system failures.
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Examples
SpaceShipTwo 
On October 31, 2014, Virgin Galactic’s SpaceShipTwo, piloted by Peter 
Siebold and Michael Alsbury and under development by Scaled Composites, 
crashed in the Mojave Desert, resulting in the death of copilot Alsbury and 
significant injuries to pilot Siebold (Figure 1.3). The National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB) ruled this as pilot error in premature unlocking of 
the spacecraft’s reentry feathering. Scaled Composites, in its hazard analysis, 
failed to account for the possibility of premature unlocking of the feather due 
to human error in its cockpit design phase. The flight test data card indicated 
the copilot was to unlock the feathering system at an air speed of Mach 1.4 
during the boost phase of the flight. The feather was unlocked prematurely 
at 0.8 Mach, which led to the breakup of the spacecraft. 
NTSB found that Scaled Composites did not emphasize human error 
in the overall execution of its SpaceShipTwo program. The lack of oversight 
and guidance in the emerging commercial space flight industry was probably 
contributory to the mishap. The specific outcome of this tragic event was the 
design and integration of a device that inhibits premature feather unlocking.
Figure 1.3. SpaceShipTwo. (Jeff Foust under CC BY 2.0)
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Space Shuttle Launch and Entry Suit
In the early Space Shuttle Program, there was no way for the crew to escape 
from the orbiter unless it was on the pad or had landed safely. During the 
flight phases (launch and landing), crew escape was not available as the sys-
tems were not designed for this potential scenario. After the Challenger disas-
ter, modifications were made to the orbiter and to crew training that would 
permit egress at a certain timeframe during the descent phase. In addition, 
the LES worn by Shuttle crewmembers was also redesigned. The first LES 
system used an air-cooled garment, which was not efficient in removal of 
the metabolic heat load, which led to an increase in orthostatic intolerance 
affecting almost one third of the crew. The new LES included a liquid-cooled 
garment that corrected the problem. 
This major redesign of the LES was also required to accommodate crew 
walking. Short bouts of exercise resulted in an accumulation of CO2 in the 
suit, which hindered crew performance.
Apollo 13 Carbon Dioxide Removal from the Spacecraft 
In preparation of the Apollo 13 spacecraft for launch, a problem was dis-
covered in an oxygen tank in the service module. Engineers at both the 
Kennedy Space Center and the Manned Spacecraft Center (Johnson Space 
Center) conducted testing and evaluation and determined it did not need to 
be replaced. After nearly two days in transit, the crew began to prepare the 
spacecraft for lunar rendezvous and orbit. Shortly after a series of procedures, 
an explosion occurred. This explosion changed the course of the mission and 
greatly impacted the safety of crew. While they could not simply turn around 
and return, they had to continue around the moon and begin their return.
The explosion crippled several systems on the Odyssey, including CO2 
removal. Engineers and physicians worked with the crew to design makeshift 
systems to reduce CO2 by using equipment onboard. This included using 
Aquarius, the Lunar Module for power and temporary crew quarters until 
the descent phase and splashdown. 
International Spacecraft Docking
In the early 1970s, the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to a docking mission 
of an Apollo capsule and a Soyuz capsule. The two spacecraft had different 
atmospheres, so engineers and physician with different skill sets, language, 
and culture developed and tested protocols for docking and conducting joint 
on orbit operation. The concern of all was the need for crew health and safety 
and prevention of decompression and the bends.
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This early work demonstrated the need to work closely together 
and served as the foundation for the current multinational effort in the 
International Space Station Project.
U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship 
The U.S. Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS; Figure 1.4) is designed to 
be more automated than most of the Navy’s ships, which means less human 
interface. It also was designed to operate close to the shore. Setbacks in 
design and performance have resulted in delays and cost overruns. Recent 
failures point to the lack of HSI in the planning and operations of the ship. 
According to a Government Accounting Office (GAO), the original design 
of the ship was to include a crew of 55–60, but workload studies have found 
the LCS to be understaffed based on the original design. The GAO reports 
that 12 ships were built before the design was fully tested. This includes 
all the tasks associated with maintaining the seaframe and getting it ready 
for the next mission operationally. The GAO reports that sailors aboard the 
ships are averaging just 6 hours of sleep, due to the amount of work that 
needs to be done in maintaining the system and training. This report also 
indicates a lack of understanding on how the systems could be maintained 
without the added cost and additional support from contractors.
Figure 1.4. USS Freedom (LCS-1). (U.S. Navy/JoAnna Delfin)
11
While some tasks could be accomplished with a certain crew comple-
ment, some cannot. This requires redesign in training and increased person-
nel as well as system components.
Conclusion
Engineers, life scientists, and physicians all approach the same developmen-
tal problem differently. While the scientific method is part of the training 
for each discipline, the approach to solving problems is performed in unique 
ways. While there are many reasons for these differences, the ability for each 
of these diverse disciplines to communicate effectively with each other can 
enable better design and potentially avoid serious or fatal consequences that 
only become apparent in the system operations phase.
The practice of medicine is subjective. Think of the subjective, objective, 
assessment, and plan (SOAP) notes that a physician uses. An engineer will 
use standard tests with expected outcomes based on empirical and research 
evidence. A physician will conduct a variety of tests and may have to try 
multiple interventions that may or may not answer the questions or lead to 
resolution of the problems at hand, due largely to the variability and ever 
adapting and changing nature of biologic systems. 
An organization that has the responsibility to build a spacecraft, put a 
human in it, and send it into space must bring multiple disciplines together to 
achieve this goal. HSI is an integral component of all three disciplines. The 
human factors communities of practice, from human factors engineering to 
behavioral health practitioners and researchers, are critical to this endeavor. 
HSI is concerned with the integration of humans into all systems, specifically 
where the human is operating, maintaining, and supporting the assembled 
system. When the engineers are given the task to build a system that involves 
humans, the risk of catastrophic failure increases if the “human” elements are 
not fully and adequately addressed. Therefore, it is absolutely imperative for 
every discipline to be present and to actively participate in the early design 
phase, and each subsequent design and development phase, until the system 
is fully operational. 
The profound differences between the fields of engineering, life sci-
ences, and medicine will be explored in this manuscript. Possible reasons 
for the differences in practices in these communities will be discussed, and 
examples of effective communication that are enhancing systems develop-
ment and HSI will be provided. The adverse impact of other dynamics, such 
as cost and schedule, will also be explored. It is the hope of the authors 
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that this manuscript will enhance understanding and cross-cultural/scien-
tific communication between the disciplines of engineering, life sciences, 
and medicine, resulting in improved HSI for all human-rated systems, espe-
cially exploration-class space vehicles. If HSI is ineffective in exploration-
class space vehicles, the mission outcome will likely be catastrophic failure 
with loss of crew, based on flight duration and inability to abort with timely 
return to the planet. We cannot afford to make the kinds of errors in HSI 
that have been made in legacy systems—we must get this right before the 
mission launches.
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Technical Authority in NASA
Mark Weyland, MS
Abstract: NASA Technical Authority (TA) is a part of the governance model 
the Agency utilizes as part of the checks and balances to ensure that decisions 
have the benefit of different points of view and are not made in isolation. 
TA is kept separate from programmatic authority to provide independent 
oversight of programs and projects without cost and schedule pressures. TA 
originates with the NASA Administrator and is formally delegated down to 
specific individuals who have authority for one of the three TA disciplines: 
(1) Engineering, (2) Safety and Mission Assurance, and (3) Health and 
Medical. Communication is more challenging for the Health and Medical 
Technical Authority (HMTA) for two primary reasons. First, there are not 
sufficient HMTA representatives spread throughout the programs and proj-
ects as baseline support. This was actually done with forethought, but the 
workaround, discussed below, isn’t working. Second, the nuances of medical 
risk can be very different from engineering risk, and most design engineers 
and program/project managers have backgrounds in engineering and not the 
health and medical disciplines. 
Keywords: technical authority, engineering, health and medical, governance
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Introduction
Following the Space Shuttle Columbia accident and a subsequent Columbia 
Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) recommendation, NASA established 
independent technical authorities as part of a set of checks and balances for 
programs and projects. It was felt that cost and schedule pressures, inherent 
in any program or project, contributed to some hazards being minimized, 
ignored, or not brought forward to higher levels of management, ultimately 
leading to mission failure and loss of life. The cost and schedule pressure 
issue was removed by establishing independent technical authorities, organi-
zationally separate and funded outside of programs and projects. They were 
given responsibility for ensuring standards and requirements were imple-
mented correctly as well as dispositioning variances to those requirements 
with a direct path to the NASA Administrator if necessary. 
NASA established independent technical authority (TA) oversight for (1) 
Engineering (ETA), (2) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MATA), and (3) 
Health and Medical (HMTA). These three areas were selected to encompass 
a majority of technical standards and to ensure that decisions have the ben-
efit of different points of view and are not made in isolation. NASA separates 
the roles for programmatic and technical authorities to provide an organi-
zational structure that emphasizes the Authorities’ shared goal of mission 
success while taking advantage of the different perspectives each brings. 
Technical authority originates with the Administrator and is formally del-
egated to the NASA Chief Engineer for ETA; the Chief, Safety and Mission 
Assurance for S&MATA; and the Chief Health and Medical Officer for 
HMTA. Subsequent delegations are made to selected individuals at center 
organizational levels.
Challenges and Opportunities
Some of the possible reasons that health, medical, and performance require-
ments not adequately addressed in the early phases of vehicle design are inad-
equate communication, poorly written and understood health and medical 
standards, and the fact that NASA is predominantly an engineering organi-
zation. The engineers in charge of designing and operating human-occupied 
spacecraft simply are not trained in the specific disciplines encapsulated by 
health, medical, and human performance. Many times in NASA’s history, 
these requirements have been an afterthought, which has resulted in either 
higher cost, higher risk, or both. Having an independent HMTA, in theory, 
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forces programs and projects to address these issues earlier in the design life 
cycle. Unfortunately, in practice, the HMTA is not funded appropriately, 
resulting in too few health and medical personnel to adequately address the 
issues raised. Further, the delegated TA personnel who would help the pro-
grams and projects catch issues early on simply are not fully integrated. The 
Agency recognized this resource gap when the three TAs were established 
and has attempted to use ETA and S&MATA personnel as the eyes and ears 
to catch health and medical issues on their behalf. This has limited effec-
tiveness. ETA and S&MATA personnel cannot be adequately trained, and 
their educational background and work experiences (mostly engineering) do 
not lend themselves to understanding the different nuances in medical risk 
arising from the many disciplines with human health and performance as 
an endpoint. As a result, many health, medical, and performance require-
ments are either misunderstood or missed entirely until the issue reaches a 
higher level where trained personnel intervene. This “late” intervention usu-
ally increases cost, risk, or both.
Opportunity exists however, to not only provide better service to pro-
grams and projects by identifying and helping solve issues and meet health, 
medical, and performance requirements, but to also educate the broader 
engineering community. This opportunity exists by adequately funding and 
staffing the HMTA with enough properly trained personnel who would 
“live” within the programs and projects (the same as ETA and S&MATA 
personnel) and be part of the team from the beginning. While indepen-
dently funded, these TA personnel would be seen as assets and not as burdens 
throwing requirements over the fence without follow-up or support.
Conclusion
After the Columbia accident, NASA established TAs to play an influential 
and relevant role in providing alternate perspectives in the program and proj-
ect decision-making process and alerting the Agency to potentially hazardous 
conditions. TA responsibility for establishing requirements as well as waivers 
to those requirements calls for in-depth knowledge of the program or project 
and frequent, effective communication with the project managers and higher 
level Agency officials. All TAs share the challenge of ensuring that enough of 
the right people—those with proper training and education—are embedded 
in the right places of the program or project. The HMTA has the additional 
burden of educating, explaining, and justifying decisions on requirements 
that are not as familiar to the design engineers and program/project managers 
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due to the very different nature of requirements with human health and per-
formance as an endpoint. Former NASA Administrator Charlie Bolden said, 
“Technical authority is an important voice at the table. It is integral to how 
we do our work and it is part of a team environment ensuring that we invite, 
listen to, and value all viewpoints.”
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The Complexities, Risks, and Rewards of 
Human/Machine Interdependent  
Space Systems and Missions
Marc Shepanek, PhD, and Cynthia Null, PhD
Abstract: The complexities, risks, and rewards of human-machine interde-
pendent space systems and missions are human endeavors, whose ultimate 
mission is to enable human understanding and meet human goals. The chap-
ter addresses principles and requirements of design to engage the strengths 
of machines in computation, precise action, and repetition and human 
strengths in flexibility to resolve unanticipated dynamics and maintain goal 
orientation through unforeseen circumstances. Cognitive processes that 
act economically and efficiently, demanding few resources, and cognitive 
processes that are intentional, making choices and decisions consciously on 
what to think and do, are highlighted. The pivotal concept of human error 
and demonstrated effective approaches are included in the analysis, as is a 
focus on the strengths of diversity in effective human machine functioning. 
The development and application of these cognitive processes is the focus of 
this chapter. 
Keywords: human-machine interface, human-machine interdependence, 
human-machine strengths, human-machine challenges, human-machine error, 
human-machine diversity, human error, machine error, cognitive diversity
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Introduction
A wide range of machines have successfully traversed space from Sputnik 
to Voyager, Venera to Mariner, Rosetta to Opportunity, not to mention the 
great observatories: the Hubble Space Telescope, Compton Gamma Ray 
Observatory, Chandra X-ray Observatory, and Spitzer Space Telescope. Each 
of these complex systems was engineered for and has endured high accelera-
tion, extreme heat and cold, intense radiation, high impact, clouds of super-
heated sulfuric acid, rust-laden dust storms, and complete vacuum. All of 
these spacecraft achieved milestones in science and exploration despite mis-
takes made in grinding the lens for a mirror, not accounting for environmen-
tal factors on a planetary surface, and even the direct impact of radiation. 
The history of crewed space missions is replete with triumph and tragedy: 
Yuri Gagarin on Vostok 1, Neil Armstrong on Apollo 11, Soyuz 11, and the 
loss of Challenger and Columbia.
These missions are human endeavors. They were, and future missions 
will be, conceived to meet human goals to explore and understand our world, 
our galaxy, and the universe. From conceptualization, to design, to hardware 
development, to launch, to mission control, to data gathering, to transmis-
sion, and to spacecraft return, missions are created and managed by humans. 
Safety and success have always been and will always be dependent on engag-
ing the strengths and addressing the weaknesses of humans and machines. 
Early spacecraft, such as Gemini and Apollo, were developed at a time 
when the field of human factors was still in its adolescence. Nevertheless, 
human factors’ design principles were applied to controls and displays, as 
well as to seats and suits to protect the astronauts and enable them to perform 
their tasks. From a human system integration (HSI) approach, there are at 
least three principles that must be applied to all human-tended missions, as 
well as to mission systems and artifacts design: (1) mission demands on the 
humans are compatible with human capabilities and limitations, (2) mission 
systems take advantage of unique human capabilities enabling use of human 
capabilities in non-routine and unpredicted situations, and (3) systems can 
tolerate and recover from errors (both machine and human). By human capa-
bility, we are referring not just to physical capability and health status, but 
also to all the human activities that result in mission success, including per-
ception, cognition, and analysis and problem solving. To enable such design, 
we need to understand ourselves as well as our vehicles and other critical 
mission systems in context. The result of considering the respective strengths 
of machines and humans in environmental context will be more appropri-
ate task assignment and system complexity. Machines used for computation, 
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repetition, and precise action in conjunction with humans anticipating prob-
lems, engaging flexibly to resolve unexpected dynamics, and maintaining 
orientation and progress will serve to accomplish mission success.
Evidence
Based on decades of research by behavioral and cognitive sciences as well as 
neuroscience, two types of cognitive processes have been identified to account 
for human behavior broadly described as automatic and controlled, Systems 
1 and 2, respectively. System 1 processes act economically and efficiently and 
demand fewer resources, automatically handling much of our daily activities. 
System 2 is how we think of ourselves—that is, the conscious, intentional, 
reasoning self that has beliefs, makes choices, and decides what to think and 
do. We believe we know what goes on in the mind. How we perceive our-
selves thinking is a very limited view. Our capabilities are much richer. 
There is just too much information in the world. Our systems are sens-
ing and processing massive of amounts of information continuously. A poorly 
designed system will be swamped with the sheer volume of information. 
Without the ability to act fast in the face of uncertainty, we as a species surely 
would have perished long ago. Although incorrect behaviors may attract our 
attention, analysis of human capability should have us marveling at its pre-
ponderance of correct actions, new ideas, creative solutions, and resilience.
Both systems learn throughout our entire lives. Some functions of System 
1 are shared across individuals, and others are quite specific to specialized 
experts. System 1 analyzes the world, protects us, learns from both correct 
and incorrect responses, and makes suggestions to the slower, more delibera-
tive System 2. This is an important distinction. Designing based only on 
insight into System 2 capabilities and processes is insufficient and increases 
mission risk. To meet our design principles, the design takes advantage of 
both systems. Because System 1 is silent, the understanding of the role a 
human capability plays in mission success and how to design to meet these 
needs requires domain knowledge and scientific methods from behavioral 
science and human factors.
Humans are flexible, creative, and adaptable. We have a vast set of skills 
acquired over a lifetime of trial and error. We successfully live and adjust to 
the ever-changing, complex natural and social environments. We success-
fully work and adapt to complex engineered environments and technolo-
gies. Human performance needs to be understood in these contexts, with 
the understanding that new environments and new missions may require 
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novel approaches to support human performance. The ability of System 1 to 
recognize patterns and generalize solutions to new problems is key to success-
fully coping with non-routine and unpredictable situations. Understanding 
expertise is not a matter of examining what an expert knows by asking 
System 2. Training expertise is not just a matter of training System 2. That 
is, training content and methods must reflect not just the hardware design 
and tasks, but they must also support development and retention of knowl-
edge and expertise. 
To control the human-machine interface, is it possible to protect the sys-
tem with more rules, tell people to put in more effort, be more careful, and 
otherwise actively enforce compliance? General research in this area suggests 
that this is not an effective approach. Telling people what they should have 
done in the past and ignoring the active processes of humans in an environ-
ment is not likely to be productive. Issuing orders to humans to engage with 
repetitive, machine-like precision while reducing autonomy, variety, diversity, 
creativity, and reactivity is asking humans to engage machine strengths while 
stripping them of human strengths. This process effectively makes those sys-
tems less flexible and less adaptive and plays less to the respective strengths 
of humans and machines. Instead of trying to protect systems from their 
human and machine components, a better approach would be to engage the 
respective strengths of machines and operators. 
It is natural that many of our concerns about space safety and human 
performance focus on the potential for human error since there may be little 
recourse for correction in complex, high-risk space operations where degraded 
human performance may have disastrous consequences. The descriptions of 
how humans succeed, and sometimes fail, often differ only by the outcome. 
The expression of expertise and error are governed by the same processes. 
Our scientific understanding of human error does not come from studying 
error as a separate process, but rather, by understanding human behavior. 
It is not erratic behavior, accident-proneness, or even personality fac-
tors that are useful in predicting accidents, despite conventional wisdom that 
errors are the result of human predispositions to unreasonable error or risk 
taking. Analysis in hindsight frequently creates a seemingly straightforward 
path to the individuals to blame. However, this approach does not consider 
environment or interaction. A pivotal concept for human analysis is that 
the label “human error” is an attribution, not a fact. Attribution theory has 
demonstrated that outside observers often postulate personal characteristics 
as the cause of behavior that has a negative outcome, not the context or envi-
ronment in which the behavior took place. Conversely, research has shown 
that when individuals are asked about negative outcome resulting from their 
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own behavior, they attributed it to environmental, not personal, factors. So, a 
video recording of a car running a red light would commonly be judged by a 
third party as being the result of an irresponsible or inattentive driver, though 
the driver would likely attribute the behavior to environmental factors or a 
competing goal (such as emergency assistance). The fundamental attribution 
error emphasizes personal characteristics and minimizes situational explana-
tions when judging the behavior of others, and it conversely emphasizes the 
situational explanations and minimizes personal characteristics when judg-
ing one’s own action. 
Working backward from an outcome can result in an analysis that over-
simplifies a chain of events, creates a false impression of the obviousness of 
cause, and imputes knowledge to the actors that they did not and could not 
have had, often ignoring or misunderstanding the positive contributions of 
System 1. This can result in conclusions in which uncertainty is underesti-
mated and in suggested solutions that may be too simple, mechanistic, and 
focused on the past. After a mishap, such as an off-nominal landing of an air-
craft, one might conclude that the pilot failed to monitor airspeed based on 
the observation that the landing speed was greater than necessary. The pilot 
may not be able to provide a satisfactory explanation as to why they landed 
at that speed. Although pilots are using procedures and actively engaging 
System 2, System 1 is analyzing sensory data such as visual, auditory, olfac-
tory, or vestibular, comparing with patterns, and using expertise to guide 
actions. Airplane response to specific mechanical as well as environmental 
factors, known by System 1, may be influencing the choice to land with a 
speed exceeding known minimums to provide a safety margin.
NASA is an engineering organization engaging in challenging scientific 
missions on the world stage. Engineering education is highly specialized. 
Trained to solve problems, engineers strive to define and work with math-
ematically precise requirements. From students to seasoned professionals, 
NASA engineers work not only as individuals, but also in teams, to solve 
problems and create technology to safely perform specific tasks. Training 
in engineering includes the mastery of specialized vocabulary, experiential 
learning, integration of specific values, and a hierarchy of conceptualization 
and development for work products. In short, engineering education initi-
ates and inculcates engineers and engineering culture to solve engineering 
tasks. The human adds the educational and cultural set of being an engineer 
to their identity. Basic engineering education does not require substantial 
training in human factors; it requires training in addressing defined require-
ments. Human engineers build spacecraft. It is incumbent on any one or 
institution that wants to affect this process to understand it and work within 
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its structure. From astronaut to scientist, physician to politician, remaining 
stovepiped within our own culture, language, and informational rhythm is 
an ineffective way to achieve anything.
Diversity is a strength in formulating ideas, conceptualizing approaches, 
considering alternatives, and solving problems. A range of training in differ-
ent scientific or engineering disciplines, cultural background, upbringing, 
thought processes, and life experiences is an asset. Communication, on the 
other hand, requires precision. Especially for space mission development, it 
is important to understand the life cycle of an effort, have a common under-
standing of terms, know where inputs are required or can be accommodated, 
and know what outputs are needed. 
NASA’s ability to integrate the best of human thought, ingenuity, and 
hard work will be defined in large part by our success in bridging the gap 
between human and hardware—the human-machine interface. There is a 
broad spectrum for the human factor, from physiology to human factors 
engineering. Engaging the full spectrum increases the odds of success, and 
ignoring any portion courts disaster. At NASA, human factors is a criti-
cal discipline for assuring that the Agency’s work efforts and projects are 
formulated and designed in such a way that the people performing opera-
tions—whether they are astronauts, pilots, launch and mission controllers, 
or thousands of others with direct contact with mission systems during 
manufacture, testing, integration, and maintenance—can perform their 
functions effectively in the environments where the functions must be con-
ducted. NASA human factors professionals conduct research on human per-
formance, develop requirements and guidelines for designers, and engage in 
operations support at every level. Human factors subject matter experts are 
occasionally a resource in identification of mishap root causes and hazards. 
Human factors can include psychiatrists, psychologists and other behavioral 
health professionals. NASA has ten field centers; all have behavioral health 
support staff, five have identifiable human factors organizations and person-
nel, and over half engage in or support research involving some aspect of 
human factors.
A productive approach to mission development is to acknowledge the 
complexity and uncertainty of the unknown and actively engage more 
human strengths. Mission success could be increased at the human-machine 
interface by engaging well-designed and -maintained machines to provide 
useful information and action in a reliable manner. Nevertheless, mission 
success may be better served by increasing, not decreasing, access to human 
foresight, insight, planning flexibility, analysis, and creativity at the human-
machine interface. 
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By developing an understanding of the critical process of engineering, 
human health, and human factors, it will be possible to integrate the strength 
of machines with the flexibility of humans. In short, a well-designed human-
machine interface. Without that advance effort and integration, design flaws 
will propagate. Moreover, in a worst-case scenario, space missions will be 
forced to rely on the strength of humans and the flexibility of machines. We 
can choose a better path.
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Differences in Physician, Engineer,  
and Life Scientist Training, Practice,  
Problem Solving, and Approach to Failure
Daniel Buckland, MD, PhD, MS, and Sarah Miller, PhD
Abstract: Many of the failures in communication among physicians, engi-
neers, and life scientists may be due to the differing ways that they approach 
problems. More than mere personality differences, physicians, engineers, and 
life scientists are trained with different problem-solving philosophies and 
strategies. This chapter discusses these differences, provides several example 
problems that characterize these three different ways of thinking, outlines 
the corresponding differing approaches to failure, and concludes with a glos-
sary of some terms that are used in different ways across these three fields.
Keywords: physicians, engineers, life scientists, problem solving, failure 
analysis, communication
Note: Portions of the following chapter were published as part of a similar series on 
Medgadget.com and are reproduced with the permission of the publisher.
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Introduction
Inherent in the complex problem solving required in human exploration 
of space are interactions between physicians, engineers, and life scientists. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that when one corrals several intelligent 
individuals in a room, progress is made. However, as the information and 
theoretical examples below demonstrate, when differently trained individu-
als come together to solve a problem, each has different assumptions about 
the problem-solving framework that will be employed—and, typically, an 
individual does not realize that these different frameworks exist. Greater 
understanding of the framework and context of each profession may reduce 
interdisciplinary misunderstandings, allow complementation of each profes-
sion’s strengths and weaknesses, and ultimately lead to more efficient col-
laborations, while a combination of these three different approaches may 
yield more robust solutions.
The three types of problem solvers presented below—physicians, engi-
neers, and life scientists—are meant as archetypes. Of course, individuals 
would use a mix of these problem-solving methods based on their knowl-
edge and experience, but they may never have received formal training in 
methods other than the ones specific to their field of expertise. These sim-
plistic descriptions are not meant to imply that all individuals in each of the 
described groups are alike or that they are incapable of utilizing multiple 
problem-solving frameworks. These archetypes were developed based on the 
experiences of the coauthors, who have an MD, a PhD in Aeronautics and 
Astronautics, and a PhD in Biochemistry between them with relevant aca-
demic, government, and industry exposure. 
The Three Types and Their Approach to Problem Solving
The Physician
Physicians are trained in medical school to think about differentials and 
categories. A patient’s presenting signs and symptoms are processed, then 
historical information is used to determine the most common diagnosis asso-
ciated with that dataset, with highly dangerous but less common diagnoses 
also included. More complicated tests are applied based on both the common 
and dangerous potential diagnoses, and then treatment is often based on the 
outcomes of those tests. This is a categorical approach to problem solving; 
the physician tries to determine what category the patient belongs in, and 
then treatment is based on the assigned category. This is a very efficient 
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system when a patient has a problem that has been encountered before and 
when there exists a dataset to which the patient can be matched. Often, a 
thorough dissection of the problem is not even needed because this problem-
solving approach is based on probabilities. Computer programmers would 
refer to the physician’s approach as searching a “known set,” which is often 
the fastest way to find a solution if the solution is in the set. However, when 
the patient has a novel problem, this is a very inefficient approach, as the 
physician moves to less and less common solutions; that is, the known set 
approach is the slowest if the solution is not in the set, as all possibilities must 
be excluded before determining that the answer is not there.
The Engineer
If the physician is trained to solve a problem by applying a known set of 
solutions that can be applied, then the engineer is trained to take a known 
solution and then use that as a starting point to formulate a more specific 
solution that applies to the discrete problem at hand. Both can be compared 
to the life scientist starting with a new set of hypotheses for each problem. 
Like the life scientist, the engineer tries to break down the problem; however, 
the engineer does not break it down all the way if this level of detail is not 
required to solve the problem. Thus, the engineer is not always looking for 
root cause when creating a system or novel solution. Instead, the problem is 
only simplified to the degree required to yield a solution that works with the 
least amount of change from the current paradigm (however, see below for 
further discussion of how engineers determine root cause in failure analysis). 
Going back to our programming analogy, this is a “local search,” in that 
the engineer is looking for an efficient way to find an optimal solution. The 
search is completed as soon as more solutions do not improve on an already 
established solution, but it may miss a more optimal solution that is not close 
to initial parameters of the search. 
The Life Scientist
In contrast to the physician and engineer, who each have the goal of pro-
ducing specific desired outcomes, the goal of the life scientist is to thor-
oughly understand a biological process or system that already exists. The life 
scientist is trained to explore biological problems using testable hypotheses 
and, critically, control experiments to isolate all the key components of a 
biological process and determine how they work together to facilitate that 
process—in other words, application of the scientific method to understand 
how living systems work. Addressing problems in this way is more resource- 
and time-intensive than the physician’s method, but if the proper hypotheses 
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are posed, this system can handle a broader range of problems and generate 
new data that are applicable to other problems. Programmers would call this 
approach a “global search,” which is often the least efficient way to find a 
solution, but the solution found would have a higher chance of being the 
optimal solution because (ideally) it considers the most information.
Three Approaches to Three Problems
This section poses a problem and then describes how the three archetypes 
described above could approach solving the problem. Each one is meant to 
show that none of the problem-solving types is inherently better than the 
others and that there is no right or wrong way to approach these problems. 
Instead, these scenarios are meant to show that, due to the nature of the 
training and problem-solving approaches each archetype utilizes, they are 
each differently suited to different types of specific situations.
1) Patient A started coughing this morning. What should she do about it?
The Physician: What are the most common causes of cough? What are the 
deadliest causes of cough? For this patient’s age and medical history, which 
of those causes are most likely? Has she been treated successfully for a cough 
in the past? Would any test results change the treatment plan? Treatment will 
be based on what has historically worked best for the most likely diagnosis.
The Engineer: What is different now than when she was not coughing? 
What was she doing this morning when the cough started? If she tries one 
treatment and gets a little better, then she should use more of it to get a 
greater effect.
The Life Scientist: If it is infectious, what is causing the infection? If we 
find what is causing the infection, do we know how it is causing the cough 
or irritation?
In this case, the physician probably has the fastest and most efficient route 
to diagnosis and treatment plan if there is a common cause for the cough. 
The life scientist’s method, when it eventually gets to a treatment, will have 
produced a lot of information, but it would take a longer time and be very 
resource-intensive. However, if there is an uncommon cause for the cough, 
the life scientist’s method will be more likely to find it. The engineer’s 
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method could work as well but does not use the shortcuts of the physician or 
the robust strategy of the scientist.
2) Patient B had her gallbladder removed by Dr. C. Dr. C performs a 
laparoscopic procedure, but the tools she uses do not work the way she 
wants them to and she feels that she spends too much time struggling with 
the equipment rather than performing the procedure. Other surgeons say 
they have the same problem too. What should be done?
The Physician: What have other surgeons done to compensate for the 
unwieldy tools? Do any of those methods fix the problem of taking too much 
time struggling with equipment?
The Engineer: What exactly does the surgeon like and dislike about the 
system? How could we modify the current system to keep the benefits and 
lose the difficulties?
The Life Scientist: How would we, from first principles, design a novel lapa-
roscopic system that does not have those problems?
For this issue, the engineer probably has the most efficient approach. Rather 
than starting from scratch like the life scientist, or treating the problem as 
fixed like the physician, the engineer’s approach looks for the simplest novel 
solution using the current context.
3) Patients D, E, F, G and H all have a form of slow-growing cancer that 
no one has seen before. The patients are all related, but they do not carry 
any of the genetic mutations known to be associated with other cancers. 
What type of therapy should be used for patients with this disease?
The Physician: Of all the cancer types known, which one is the closest to 
this one? How is that cancer treated? If that does not work, what is the next 
closest match? How is that cancer treated?
The Engineer: What makes this cancer different than the closest match that 
has been treated in the past? Can we use that difference to modify the treat-
ment plan?
The Life Scientist: How does this cancer work? What genetic mutations 
and/or environmental factors are driving the cancer cells to proliferate? Can 
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that information be used to determine how to selectively kill the cancer cells 
without harming healthy cells within the patient?
In this case, because there exists very little information about the problem 
itself, the life scientist’s method is probably the best approach “scientifically” 
to take for identifying a long-term plan for treating patients with this disease. 
However, the physician’s method arrives at a treatment faster, but it is more 
uncertain and may cause more pain and discomfort with less overall benefit 
if the closest analogy has a very different root cause. The engineer method 
looks at these differences to try to find a solution.
Three Forms of Failure Analysis
Another important difference in training and practice between the three 
archetypes is how they approach failure analysis. Failure analysis is more 
of an introspective skill set than problem solving or design, one that entails 
a different set of biases. Something possibly went wrong, and the task is to 
find the error, adding a dimension of responsibility that the above discussion 
of problem solving does not necessarily entail. The assumptions of personal 
accountability and responsibility differ among the archetypes, and this can 
affect how they each approach problems or reviews of another group’s per-
formance. Especially in multi-disciplinary endeavors where multiple teams 
and individuals are responsible for different system components, defending 
the decisions leading to an error can be an important consideration when 
contemplating a new approach or idea. How will they defend this decision to 
peers and outside reviewers if things do not go well? Moreover, in what envi-
ronment will they be defending it? Much like problem solving, understand-
ing the differing approaches to failure analysis can improve collaboration and 
prevent misunderstandings that are likely to occur when reviewing errors or 
outcomes in a multi-disciplinary group.
The Physician: When physicians talk about failure or mishaps formally, it is 
usually in a meeting called “Morbidity and Mortality” (M&M). The M&M 
is considered so important to the medical profession that the Accreditation 
Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME), the organization 
responsible for accrediting medical residency programs in the United States, 
requires M&M sessions to be held regularly during a physician’s training. In 
an ideal M&M meeting, a case that resulted in an undesired outcome is pre-
sented to the entire medical staff of a department or organization. Then the 
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group will ask questions of the responsible staff to try to determine whether 
the outcome was avoidable and, if so, where the fault lies. Many states spe-
cifically1 exempt these meetings from being used to determine legal liabil-
ity, emphasizing that the purpose of an M&M is not assignment of blame, 
but rather quality control and education. In these meetings, blame is often 
assigned and also often accepted during peer group discussions. While the 
precise M&M meeting interpersonal dynamics depend on the level of respect 
within the group, an accusatory atmosphere is typically prevented through 
a baseline assumption of physician competence. In contrast to the other two 
groups, physicians are usually more likely to give their colleagues the benefit 
of the doubt. The questions raised during these sessions are highly collabora-
tive in tone, and participants often precede their queries with a statement 
that they do not know what they would have done differently in the same 
situation. However, this approach can be limiting to new ideas. Often it is 
easier to defend a choice if it followed the standard of care, even if that choice 
was objectively worse for the patient.
The Engineer: Once again, the engineer functions somewhat midway 
between the physician and the life scientist. Though the nomenclature dif-
fers between industries and organizations, most engineering groups have 
some form of weekly or monthly “inci-
dent reviews” (see inset). In these 
Other names are Lessons Learned, 
Fault Tree Analysis, Wishbone, or 
Root Cause Analysis depending 
on the method used. Ironically, 
engineers in the non-medical field 
often call them “Postmortems.”
meetings, “failure” can mean any-
thing from a catastrophic collapse of a 
whole system to a validation test in 
which some components performed 
outside of specifications. In contrast to 
the engineer’s approach to problem 
solving, here, the engineering group is 
focused on finding the root cause of the error. Often, a no-fault approach is 
used to facilitate individuals to speak up without fear of blame. In systems 
involving human users, many engineers are trained to follow a “Swiss cheese” 
model of fault analysis. In this model, the engineer acknowledges that it is 
rarely one error that causes a failure, but rather, several errors, each from a 
different source, typically align to allow the failure to occur. The underlying 
assumption of this model is that failure is inevitably going to occur at some 
point, so it is not appropriate to level all the blame for failure at the final fault 
1 Connecticut’s Medical Liability laws (https://www.cga.ct.gov/current/pub/chap_368a.
htm#sec_19a-17b) (Accessed July 20, 2017).
Engineering, Life Sciences, and Health/Medicine Synergy in  
Aerospace Human Systems Integration: The Rosetta Stone Project
32
when all the precipitating errors are to blame as well. In these meetings, like 
physicians, engineers assign responsibility but not blame. Like life scientists, 
they are interested in the root cause of a failure and do not begin with an 
assumption of competence. However, as mentioned, in the engineer’s formu-
lation, it is not necessarily the fault of an individual if they did not exhibit 
competence in a given situation. In these incident reviews, meetings are usu-
ally kept orderly by a top-down approach, and it is considered the responsi-
bility of the program manager or system engineer to prevent the meetings 
from becoming acrimonious.
The Life Scientist: Most scientific groups have some variation of a weekly 
“lab meeting.” In these small group sessions, a group member will often 
present some in-progress project or recent data. Confusing results and unex-
pected data are presented, with the hope that the group can provide technical 
support, mechanistic insights, or advice for future experiments. If the results 
are unexpected, it is common to question whether the experiments were per-
formed properly and if all the appropriate controls were conducted to estab-
lish the validity of the tests. Here, the questioners often do not assume the 
competence of the presenter without data to support that the techniques were 
properly executed. This is one form of “peer review”—or the quality control 
process that occurs in science. In fact, the motto of the United Kingdom’s 
Royal Society is “Nullius in verba,”2 which roughly translates to, “does not 
take anyone’s word for it,” including your closest colleagues’. These meetings 
can become very heated, but what, theoretically, stops someone from being 
too confrontational is that they know they must stand in front of the same 
group at some point in the future and present their own data. That said, most 
academic scientists can usually tell you a story of a lab meeting where some-
one went too far and a graduate student or postdoctoral fellow was found 
crying in a cubicle later.
The differing methods in failure analysis can often be seen in the ques-
tion-and-answer sessions following presentations at large national meetings, 
which is where a lot of physicians, engineers, and life scientists first encoun-
ter one another outside of their working groups. Anecdotally, questions at 
engineering conferences tend to be more confrontational than at medical 
conferences, but less confrontational than at scientific conferences. While 
these meetings do not constitute failure analysis, the peer-review aspect of 
such meetings renders the tone of questioning critical at times, and discus-
sion tends to follow the framework of each archetype’s trained method.
2 Royal Society (http://royalsociety.org/about-us/history) (Accessed July 20, 2017).
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Archetype Vernacular Guide
Understanding the differences in problem solving and failure analysis is 
important for a broad view of how the different archetypes can think differ-
ently. One specific way in which these differences manifest is when physi-
cians, engineers, and life scientists use the same words to mean very different 
things. Clearly, this can lead to confusion and misunderstandings. In the 
examples below, each term is followed by the meaning of a common use of the 
term according to each archetype and then an example sentence for context. 
Test:
Physician: examination of symptoms or disease presence
He was tested for high blood pressure.
Engineer: determination of limits
The beam was tested to failure.
Scientist: experimentation to obtain evidence in support of a hypothesis
The protein-membrane interaction hypothesis was tested.
Risk:
Physician: effect of pre-existing factors on chance of disease
His risk of heart disease is increased by his father’s death from heart 
attack. 
Engineer: probability of a particular outcome
The risk of structural failure of this beam at 30 lbs. is 80%.
Result:
Physician: presence or absence of disease or condition
The results of the CT scan show a pulmonary embolism. 
Engineer: capabilities of a design
The results show the wing can provide lift without structural failure 
from 50 to 300 mph. 
Scientist: experimental evidence
Our results show that the protein interacts with the membrane. 
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Failure:
Physician: unsuccessful treatment
The blood pressure medicine failed to prevent a heart attack. 
Engineer: exceeded limitations
The beam failed at 40 lbs. 
Scientist: unexpected findings or technical difficulties
The protein-membrane experiment failed to support the hypothesis.
The experiment failed due to incorrect salt concentrations in the buffer.
We hope that the above discussion will help inform future discussions 
among physicians, engineers, and life scientists. As each field continues to 
train and practice in their own paradigms, there will continue to be differing 
approaches to problem solving, failure analysis and even basic vocabulary. 
However, appropriate recognition and use of these differing approaches by 
management and collaborators can lead to a more thorough common under-
standing and robust solutions by multi-disciplinary teams.
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Risk Analysis and Acceptance:  
A Model Ethical Framework
David Liskowsky, PhD
Abstract: NASA has adopted a novel ethical decision-making framework to 
guide risk acceptance decisions in cases where it is known that an established 
health, medical, or performance standard cannot be met for a proposed mis-
sion scenario. The framework is based on guidance provided in a report 
from the National Academies’ Institute of Medicine, requested by NASA, to 
address this situation. The details of the ethical decision-making framework 
are provided, as are the steps NASA has taken to implement it. Additionally, 
the possible use of the framework in realms other than health, medicine, and 
performance are discussed.
Keywords: standards, risk analysis, risk acceptance, decision-making, ethi-
cal principles, ethical responsibilities
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Introduction
Current planning for long duration space missions, including exploration 
missions to Mars, will likely expose crews to levels of known risks beyond 
those allowed by current medical, health, and performance standards. An 
example is radiation exposure, where the duration of a planned Mars mission 
scenario may result in all crewmembers possibly exceeding the established 
radiation exposure limit standard, without any effective engineering or oper-
ational means of lessening the exposure. Not being able to meet the standard 
will result in an increased health risk for the crewmembers. In such a case, 
the questions of how to proceed regarding implementing the mission, move 
from engineering and operational design solutions, into the realm of policy 
and ethical decision-making. Such questions include:
• When is it, if ever, appropriate to knowingly accept a higher level of 
risk and not meet an established standard?
• What are the policy and ethical factors that need to be considered in 
making such a decision? 
• Are there policy and ethical criteria that need to be met in order to 
justify the decision to not meet an established standard?
• What are the roles, responsibilities, and rights of the various parties 
(i.e., crewmembers, mission planners, Agency administrators) that 
would be involved in such decision-making?
In order to address this somewhat novel and vexing issue, NASA’s Office 
of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO), which is the respon-
sible NASA office for medical, health, and performance standards, engaged 
the National Academies’ Institute of Medicine (IOM) (now the National 
Academy of Medicine) to conduct a study to examine policy and ethical 
issues relevant to crew medical, health, and performance standards for explo-
ration and long duration space missions. In particular, NASA asked for guid-
ance regarding a possible framework of ethical and policy principles that can 
help guide decision-making associated with implementing health standards 
for exploration-class space missions when existing standards cannot be fully 
met, or the level of knowledge of a given condition is sufficiently limited 
that an adequate standard cannot be developed, for the mission. The IOM 
established an Ad Hoc Committee on Ethics Principles and Guidelines for 
Health Standards for Long Duration and Exploration Space flights. Some of 
the key questions the Committee addressed were:
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1. What ethical considerations are involved in developing and imple-
menting health and safety standards for manned space exploration 
when the exposures and risks are uncertain, unknown, and/or when 
exposures and risks might exceed current standards?
2. What standards of informed consent regarding the health risks of the 
mission are appropriate, and what are the ethical limits of informed 
consent processes in these circumstances? What principles should be 
applied (when relevant) to communicating the uncertainty regarding 
health risks?
3. What are appropriate modifiers for standards for protecting individu-
als when there is an incomplete understanding and knowledge of the 
potential risks or hazardous exposures, or when exposures and risks 
may exceed current standards?
4. Should all astronauts and space flight crewmembers be protected to 
the same risk level or should potential individual differences be consid-
ered? Would one standard be sufficient for the entire space flight crew 
or do known or unknown differences in risk need to be addressed to 
provide a uniform level of protection? 
The report “Health Standards for Long Duration and Exploration Space 
flight: Ethics Principles, Responsibilities, and Decision Framework” was 
released by the Committee on April 2, 2014. This chapter describes the key 
aspects of the report and the ethical principles and responsibilities described 
in it, and how NASA has incorporated them into its health and medical 
standards processes and decision-making. 
Background: Medical, Health, and Performance Standards
Similar to the engineering and safety aspects of space flight, human space 
flight involves a high degree of risk to human health and performance. These 
risks include both short term health consequences in flight (e.g., space motion 
sickness, alterations in blood pressure regulation upon return to Earth) and 
long-term health consequences that arise or continue months or years post-
flight (e.g., radiation-induced cancers, loss of bone mass). If unmitigated, 
these risks can result in serious decrements in the health of a crewmember, 
and in some cases, can even be fatal. Additionally, depending on their time 
course and nature, these unmitigated risks can have an impact on the ability 
of a crewmember to successfully perform his or her duties during a mis-
sion, and/or may have long-term health impacts later on in an individual’s 
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life. The possible acute mission impact effects of the risk, as compared to 
long term health effects later in life, can be a possible factor in making the 
determination of what level of risk can and should be accepted in a given 
mission scenario. 
In order to mitigate known human health and performance risks, medi-
cal, health, and performance standards (to be termed “health” standards in 
this chapter), have been developed that have to be met in the development 
and design of spacecraft and space operations. These standards encompass 
both human-related engineering design risks, and medical and healthcare 
risks. The engineering type standards relate to areas such as the design of 
environmental control systems, human factors engineering, and the con-
trol of air and water contaminant exposures, and they are met by appro-
priate engineering design solutions. Medical care and health issues include 
standards for the level of medical care to be available on a given class of 
space mission, and standards that define the acceptable level of decrement or 
change in the health of an individual that can be allowed. Examples of the 
latter include the maximal level of bone demineralization or muscle atrophy 
that are acceptable, and maximum levels of radiation exposure an individual 
can experience. Bone and muscle loss are examples of space flight induced 
health changes that could impact the ability of a crewmember to effectively 
carry out his or her duties during a mission, while radiation exposure is an 
example of a risk that could have long-term effects beyond the mission. These 
medical and health standards are met by the development and implementa-
tion of medical countermeasures that control the physiological changes of 
concern (e.g., exercise regimes to maintain bone and muscle strength) or 
by the establishment of allowable limits for environmental exposures (e.g., 
radiation exposure).
Policy and Ethical Framework for Decision-Making
“Excepting” a Standard
The IOM Committee first looked at possible options NASA could take if, on 
a planned human long duration space flight mission, an established health 
standard could not be met. They considered both the idea of liberalizing the 
existing health standard so it could be met, and establishing more permis-
sive health standards for long duration and exploration-class missions. In 
both cases, they determined that there was not an ethically justifiable rea-
son to implement such changes. In the case of liberalizing an existing stan-
dard, NASA’s health standards are based on the best available data, and are 
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regularly updated as new information becomes available. To liberalize them 
outside this established process would be inappropriate and arbitrary. They 
also felt that there was not a clear and compelling reason for why accept-
able risks and levels of uncertainty should be greater for long duration and 
exploration-class missions than for other human space flight missions, and 
thus, there was no justification for establishing more liberal standards for 
such missions.
Having excluded the options of modifying existing standards, the 
Committee determined that the only ethically acceptable option that could 
allow for increased risk exposures in the context of long duration and explo-
ration space flights would be granting an exception to existing health stan-
dards. The report then provided guidance on the factors and criteria that 
should be used in making the decision as to whether an exception to an 
existing standard should be made. The Committee also noted that excep-
tions to health standards should be considered on a mission-by-mission basis 
and used in very limited circumstances. 
Ethical Principles
The Committee identified a number of ethical principles that NASA should 
consider and apply when making a decision whether or not to accept addi-
tional risk and provide an exception to an existing health standard, for a 
human space flight mission. The ethical principles are:
• Avoid harm—the duty to prevent harm, exercise caution, and remove 
or mitigate harms that occur. NASA should exhaust all feasible 
measures to minimize the risks to astronauts from long duration and 
exploration space flights.
• Beneficence—the principle to provide benefit to others. NASA should 
consider in its decision-making the potential benefits of a specific 
mission, including its scientific and technological importance, as well 
as its potential beneficiaries, including current and future astronauts 
and members of society at large.
• Favorable balance of risk and benefit—the principle to seek both a 
favorable and acceptable balance between the risk of harm and potential 
for benefit. 
• Respect for autonomy—the principle to ensure that individuals have 
both the right to self-determination and processes in place to exercise 
that right. NASA should ensure that astronauts are able to exercise 
voluntariness to the extent possible in personal decision-making 
regarding participation in proposed missions, that they have all 
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available information regarding the risks and benefits of the proposed 
mission, and that they continue to be apprised of any updates to risk 
and benefit information throughout the mission.
• Fairness—the principle requires that equals be treated equally, that 
burdens and benefits be distributed fairly, and that fair processes be 
created and followed. NASA’s decision-making surrounding missions 
should explicitly address fairness, including the distribution of the 
risks and benefits of the mission, crew selection, and protections for 
astronauts after missions.
• Fidelity—the principle recognizes that individual sacrifices made for 
the benefit of society may give rise to societal duties in return. Given 
the risks that astronauts accept in participating in hazardous missions, 
NASA should respect the mutuality of obligations and ensure healthcare 
and protection for astronauts not only during the mission but post-
flight, including provision of lifetime healthcare for astronauts.
In making the decision as to whether a standard should be “excepted” or 
not, all of these principles need to be considered and weighed against each 
other. As can be seen from their definition, some of these principles com-
pete with each other. For example, the need to protect crewmembers from 
the health risks of space flight and thus “avoid harm,” competes with the 
principle of “autonomy” in which the crewmembers have the right for self-
determination and to choose the risks they are willing to take. In addition, 
in order to achieve a “favorable balance of risk and benefit,” the benefits of 
the mission, as described in the principle of “beneficence,” must be weighed 
against the need to “avoid harm.” 
Consideration of these ethical principles should be done in the context 
of various factors and criteria related to the relevant mission. These could 
include requirements that the proposed mission be expected to have excep-
tionally great social value; have great time urgency; have expected benefits 
that would be widely shared, not only to the space program but to society as 
a whole; and that the proposed mission be justified over alternate approaches 
to meeting the mission’s objectives.
As mentioned above, unlike typical space flight risk analysis decision-
making, which is based solely on engineering and statistical risk analysis and 
assessment, the consideration of these ethical principles and how they will 
apply in a given situation to guide the decision-making on a standard excep-
tion, represents a combined policy and ethical determination. As will be seen 
later in this chapter, this difference was a significant factor in shaping how 
NASA implemented this decision-making framework.
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Ethical Responsibilities
A critical component of this decision-making framework is the concept that 
the decision to accept more risk and except a standard brings with it the 
requirement to meet certain additional responsibilities in order to ethically 
justify the decision. The Committee identified a series of responsibilities to 
which NASA is morally obligated, and must meet and implement, if they are 
to accept the additional risk of granting an exception to a standard for a space 
flight mission. These responsibilities are:
• Informed decision-making: Fully inform astronauts about the risks of 
long duration and exploration space flights and make certain that the 
process is adequate and appropriate.
• Continuous learning strategy: Adhere to continuous learning (includ-
ing health surveillance and data collection) to ensure that health stan-
dards evolve and improve over time and are informed by data gained 
before, during, and after long duration and exploration space flight, as 
well as from other relevant sources.
• Independent advice: Solicit independent advice about any decision to 
allow any specific mission that fails to meet NASA health standards or 
any decision to modify health standards.
• Communicate in a transparent, fair, and timely manner: Communicate 
with all relevant stakeholders (e.g., astronauts, the public) the rationale 
for, and possible impacts related to any decision about health standards.
• Equality of opportunity: Provide equal opportunity for participation in 
long-duration and exploration space flight to the fullest extent possible. 
• Health screening, surveillance, and care: Provide preventive long-term 
health screening and surveillance of astronauts and lifetime health-
care, to protect their health, support ongoing evaluation of health 
standards, improve mission safety, and reduce risks for current and 
future astronauts.
• Privacy and confidentiality: Develop and apply policies that appropri-
ately and sufficiently protect the privacy and confidentiality of astro-
naut health data.
These responsibilities directly support the ethical principles that would 
inform the decision to grant an exception to a standard. In some cases, the 
responsibilities provide a mechanism to ensure ethical principles are appro-
priately implemented. For example, the ethical principle of “autonomy,” 
which states that individuals have a right for self-determination, requires 
the responsibility of establishing a strong and robust process for “informed 
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decision-making” to ensure potential crewmembers are fully aware of all the 
risks associated with not meeting a standard so they can decide whether or 
not to participate. Naturally, participation under these conditions would 
be strictly voluntary, and there would need to be mechanisms in place to 
ensure there would not be any negative consequences (e.g., career advance-
ment, assignment to future flights) to the crewmember for choosing not 
to participate. Another example is the ethical principle of “fidelity,” which 
acknowledges that for those who accept additional risk to themselves for the 
good of society, there is a responsibility to provide them with additional and 
enhanced health surveillance, screening, and care to address the increased 
health risk which may occur as a result of not meeting a standard. 
Additionally, implementing the responsibilities is mandatory to provide 
the moral and ethical justification to support the decision to accept the addi-
tional risk of granting an exception to a standard. A critical example of this 
is the responsibility of “continuous learning.” The decision to provide an 
exception to a standard would occur when it is known that there is not an 
engineering or operational design solution to meet the standard at the time 
critical decisions about mission planning must occur. In order to morally and 
ethically justify making that decision, there must be a genuine commitment 
to continue all efforts to gain the knowledge and technical capability to meet 
the standard in the future. Thus, this decision-making process should never 
be considered a way to circumvent established standards and requirements, 
but rather, it would be a temporary, stopgap mechanism for addressing a 
critical issue that is imposed by unavoidable mission planning circumstances 
and conditions. 
Framework
Based on the guidance provided in the IOM report, a three-tiered frame-
work of decision-making was developed. The first and broadest decision is 
whether, and under what conditions, any missions that are unlikely to meet 
current health standards are ethically acceptable. If it is decided that missions 
that fail to meet existing health standards are not acceptable, then such mis-
sions must be deferred until new knowledge about risk or uncertainties, and 
risk mitigation strategies, are available. On the other hand, if it is decided 
that such missions are acceptable, then this ethically based framework should 
be used, and the criteria and processes to support its use developed. The 
second level of decision-making is the mission-by-mission decision, using the 
framework of whether an exception to a health standard should be granted 
for a specific proposed mission. Finally, the third level of decision-making 
relates to decisions about the participation of individual crewmembers for 
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whom, because of unique factors and circumstances, a standard cannot be 
met if they were to participate in a proposed mission. This differs from the 
second level of decision-making where it is known that a given standard can-
not be met for anyone who would participate in a mission. 
NASA Implementation of the Framework
In order to implement the IOM’s guidance, the decision-making framework 
and its associated processes had to be constructed in a way that is compatible 
with NASA’s program/project management structure and how risk assess-
ment decisions are made during mission planning and development. At the 
same time, it had to recognize that the analysis and decisions associated with 
the framework are of a policy and ethical nature, rather than engineering 
and operational. In order to make the first decision of whether the Agency 
felt it was proper and wanted to implement this ethically based decision-
making framework, a proposal to do so was presented to the Agency by the 
OCHMO at the Agency-wide Program Management Council (PMC). The 
decision was made that such a framework would be an important compo-
nent of the Agency’s risk analysis and mission planning processes and that it 
should be developed and implemented.
It was decided that implementing the process should begin with a risk 
analysis by the Agency medical authorities of the acute and long-term health 
risks associated with not meeting a health standard, as well as the impact 
that could have on the ability of crewmembers to successfully carry out their 
responsibilities. This initial medical risk assessment would then be coupled 
with the standard engineering and safety risk analyses to obtain a global risk 
assessment for a proposed mission. The global risk assessment would then be 
forwarded to Agency senior management. 
It was decided that the nature of the policy and ethical decision-making 
associated with this framework necessitated that it be elevated to the level of 
Agency senior management. The consideration of such factors and making 
the decision to accept a known, unmitigated risk should be done at that level 
rather than being conducted at the level of mission implementation. Agency 
senior management would then consider the ethical and policy factors of the 
framework and make a determination of how to proceed. Conducting the 
analysis at this level would also allow the appropriate involvement of, and 
communication with, all relevant stakeholders (e.g., crewmembers, mission 
planners, external parties). This would be the case for either a decision related 
to a specific mission or the participation of an individual in a given mission.
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The key actions and responsibilities that are necessary to support evalu-
ating an exception to a health standard are:
1. Ensuring all feasible means are taken to reduce astronauts’ risk to the 
lowest achievable level and demonstrating that the standard cannot be 
met despite having done so.
2. Examining all approaches to minimizing risk, including alternate 
approaches to meeting mission objectives.
3. Thoroughly monitoring and conducting research on health impacts 
during and after space flight to inform current and future missions.
4. Having a rigorous process to assure astronauts are fully informed about 
risks and unknowns.
5. Ensuring that a crewmember’s decision to participate in a mission 
meets standards of informed decision-making and that they are making 
a voluntary decision.
6. Committing to the future health of current and future astronauts by 
ensuring access to long-term healthcare, longitudinal medical follow-
up, and preventative screenings.
If the decision is made to provide an exception to a health standard for 
either a specific mission or an individual participating in a mission, it would 
not be a medical “waiver,” but rather, an “operational exception” under the 
authority of the NASA Administrator or their designee. Thus, in this situ-
ation, it is recognized that an established and valid medical standard is not 
being met, and the decision is an administrative one rather than medical.
The specific details of the processes and steps associated with the ethical 
decision-making framework are codified in the NASA requirements docu-
ment NPR 8900.1 NASA Health and Medical Requirements for Human 
Space Exploration.
Conclusion and Discussion
Historically, Agency risk analyses, particularly in the engineering and safety 
realms, are made using statistically based probabilistic risk assessments. 
Then, based on that statistical result, a decision is made regarding risk accep-
tance. The implementation of this ethics-based decision-making framework 
related to health standards provides NASA with a mechanism that incorpo-
rates factors and considerations that typically are not part of the Agency’s 
risk assessment decision-making processes. This allows risk acceptance 
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decision-making related to health and performance issues to be carried out in 
a broader context than that provided by statistical analysis alone. If the deci-
sion is made to accept additional risk, the framework provides mechanisms 
and courses of action the Agency should take to support the decision to pro-
ceed. The structure of the framework acknowledges the additional respon-
sibilities the Agency incurs by accepting a higher level of risk and allows the 
Agency to better explain and justify the decision.
Risk decision-making associated with medical, health, and performance 
issues is well suited to the incorporation of ethical principles and responsi-
bilities. Making decisions to accept risk that can affect an individual’s health 
or medical condition, by its nature, has an ethical and moral component 
involving the ethical principles and responsibilities that have been discussed. 
However, the decision-making framework that has been implemented for 
health standards could also be considered for use in other risk analysis 
decision-making, and the same principles and responsibilities applied in the 
safety and engineering realms as well. As with health standards, this would 
provide a broader context for that decision-making, and result in a stronger 
foundation to support the acceptance of higher risk levels, particularly in 
situations where mitigation strategies are not available. While not typically 
associated with engineering and safety principles, incorporation of a role for 
ethical considerations in such risk analysis could ultimately result in more 
far-reaching mission planning and management.
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Human Systems Integration in  
Non-Human Space Flight Systems
David Fuller, BS
Abstract: This chapter illustrates how Human Systems Integration (HSI) 
applies to all of NASA’s systems. From design, operation, and sustainment of 
large complex facilities such as wind tunnels and thermos-vacuum chambers 
to seemingly mundane systems that help maintain security at the gate, HSI 
can reduce risk of injury and mission failure.
Keywords: complex systems, non-human space flight, system safety, facility 
system safety, system operation, maintainability, human system integration, 
mishap, human factors
Engineering, Life Sciences, and Health/Medicine Synergy in  
Aerospace Human Systems Integration: The Rosetta Stone Project
48
Introduction
Effective planning and implementation of Human Systems Integration 
(HSI) practice in NASA systems should be addressed in all of NASA’s sys-
tems, including non-human space flight (HSF) projects such as deep space 
and Earth observation satellites, sounding rockets, balloons, Unmanned 
Aerial Systems (UAS), and robotic exploration missions. Ground systems 
and test facilities, such as thermal-vacuum chambers, wind tunnels, and mis-
sion operations centers, can also be considered complex systems that would 
benefit from the use of HSI during all phases of the project life cycle.
HSI processes are described in detail in a previous chapter, but it is worth 
emphasizing that all of the complex systems mentioned in the above para-
graph are operated, maintained, and repaired by humans. Without consid-
ering the role of the human in the system life cycle, as early as possible, 
risk of human casualty, mission failure, and added costs and schedule delay 
are increased.
Currently, NASA Procedural Requirements (NPRs) and NASA Policy 
Directives (NPDs) regarding non-HSF projects have little or no language 
that addresses human factors or HSI considerations. NASA requirements 
pertaining to facilities and facility systems safety deal mainly with devel-
oping and executing contracts with vendors. Usually a vendor will specify 
“industry best practices” in their proposal and design or implement these 
practices as part of the statement of work.
Federal and state laws and regulations related to safety and worker pro-
tection are followed at all NASA centers and facilities. These regulations, 
however, do not explicitly address human factors associated with, for exam-
ple, reliance on the human operator to correctly interpret data and make a 
decision that might have an undesired outcome.
Maintainability is another subset of HSI that is usually not addressed 
by federal or state regulation. There are examples from many industries of 
mishaps that occurred due to a system design that made maintenance and 
inspection difficult. When a process is difficult or time-consuming to per-
form and organizational pressure is exerted to perform procedures as fast as 
possible, procedures are often performed with forgotten, or even purpose-
fully skipped, steps.
Poor maintainability design also leads to workers being injured while 
trying to perform their tasks. Recently, this author observed an inspection of 
a home furnace that required connecting pressure gauges to the refrigerant 
lines. The connection point could have been placed on an easily accessible 
front panel. Instead, the manufacturer chose to place the connection points 
496: Human Systems Integration in Non-Human Space Flight Systems 
in a space that was not only difficult to reach, but impossible to view. A 
consequence of this design decision has led to many minor cold burns by 
refrigerant gas because of technicians inadvertently hitting a pressure relief 
valve while they were reaching up into the space to connect the test device. 
This example of industry practice indicates that not all practices are neces-
sarily good just because that is the way it has always been done.
Examples of NASA Mishaps and Close Calls  
in Non-Human Space Flight Systems
The NASA Mishap Investigation System (NMIS) has many examples of 
mishaps and close calls that illustrate how HSI might have prevented loss of 
money, loss of prestige, injury, and morbidity and mortality. It is, of course, 
impossible to prove that HSI would have prevented these incidents, but it 
is certain that an HSI practitioner, providing a human factors perception, 
would have reduced the risk of these mishaps taking place.
Example 1: Solar Dynamics Observatory  
High Gain Antenna Subsystem 2 Damage
Spacecraft systems go through thermal vacuum (TVac) to ensure that the 
flight systems will perform to specification in the extreme environments 
found in orbit. A process called Bake Out is also performed to reduce outgas-
sing and potential contamination of components and systems prior to flight.
TVac test of the Solar Dynamic Observatory (SDO) High Gain Antenna 
Subsystem (HGAS) 2 took place in late November 2007, after the successful 
completion of the HGAS 1. During the holiday break, the Bake Out portion 
was suspended, to be resumed after personnel returned.
During the break, the application that provided temperature informa-
tion to the heater control function was deactivated after an operating sys-
tem (OS) update on the test system computer. The Bake Out operation was 
restarted by an operator that had not been involved with the earlier testing. 
The temperature information application that had been stopped during the 
OS update was not restarted, and the heater control system ran in an open 
loop configuration. The HGAS 2 components reached temperatures above 
150°C, severely damaging the HGAS 2, and required repairs of approxi-
mately $990,000.
The SDO HGAS TVac and Bake Out test control system was a design 
unique to the SDO project, and facility operators were not aware of the need 
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to restart the temperature information application, and no instructions or 
procedures had been written for this unique test configuration.
The Mishap Investigation Board (MIB) found that root causes 
included deficient test planning and operational procedures and inadequate 
personnel training.
Example 2: Wallops Flight Facility Runway Incursion Close Call
In June 2015, a U.S. Navy P-3 Orion aircraft conducted a touch-and-go 
maneuver at the Wallops Flight Facility (WFF) airfield. Touch-and-go 
maneuvers are routine training exercises performed by flight crews to main-
tain flight proficiency. The U.S. Navy regularly conducts training exercises 
at WFF because of its close proximity to one of its bases. 
At the time the P-3 was on final approach to the runway, an airport truck 
was making a routine periodic inspection of the runway, looking for foreign 
object debris (FOD) that could damage the aircraft.
All movement on the runways and taxiways of an airport with a con-
trol tower are coordinated by the airport tower. The tower at WFF was not 
staffed in the evenings, and the airfield would revert to a process whereby 
airfield flight activities were coordinated among the users via the Universal 
Communications (UNICOM) radio procedures. At WFF, UNICOM radio 
traffic advisories are handled by the WFF Protective Services Dispatch Office.
The Mishap Investigation Team (MIT) report cited a root cause as 
the Protective Services contract did not include specialized training for 
UNICOM operations for their security officers. This lack of training led to 
inadequate communications and handover procedures, which resulted in the 
P-3 aircraft conducting a touch-and-go maneuver while an inspection truck 
was on the runway.
Example 3: Glenn Research Center Main Gate Barrier
In June 2011, a mishap occurred in which a Glenn Research Center (GRC) 
main gate security barrier was activated while a vehicle was moving through 
the gate, causing damage to the barrier and vehicle and injury to the vehicle 
passenger. The investigation conducted by the MIT concluded that a num-
ber of human factors–related failings contributed to this mishap, including 
inadequate training, inadequate understanding of the function of the barrier 
and its safety features, and a last-minute change in standard operating pro-
cedures (SOP) of the barrier that was not properly documented and training 
in the changed SOP was not properly passed on to the security officers that 
operated the barrier.
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This change in SOP failed to consider that the control station for the 
barrier was designed and placed so that security officers had full view of 
threats approaching the gate area, and the barrier itself was behind the secu-
rity officer and therefore out of view. 
Other factors that were considered contributory were that the control 
to raise the barrier did not have a guard to prevent inadvertent activation, 
and the mishap security guard was working a double shift and might have 
been fatigued.
In these examples, and in many of the reports contained in the NASA 
Mishap Information System (NMIS), it is clear that human factors played 
a significant role in initiating or contributing to the undesired outcome. A 
review of the project by a qualified HSI practitioner would have been able to 
perceive these shortcomings and made appropriate recommendations. 
Proposed Future Efforts
Changes to NASA policy should never be undertaken without proper 
research, preparation, and review by all stakeholders. The NASA Safety 
Center (NSC) maintains a large repository of mishaps and close calls, and 
a tool called the NMIS that can be used to show the extent of human fac-
tors–related events in NASA.
Mishaps and the resulting investigations are considered trailing indica-
tors of organizational safety because they occur after the fact. Important les-
sons learned can be gleaned from these reports; however, they are limited in 
that they do not reflect the hundreds of events that occur on a regular basis 
that do not become mishaps because of human intervention.
A more important, leading indicator of organizational safety is the 
close call and hazard report. These events can be filed by anyone within 
the Agency and reflect the day-to-day processes, practices, and concerns of 
NASA employees.
An analysis of events within NMIS will provide evidence on whether 
the Agency needs to make changes to the existing policies. Other sources of 
evidence will be interviews and conversations with the NASA safety profes-
sionals in the NSC and field center safety organizations, facility management 
organizations, and system safety organizations.
Assuming that evidence supports further work, a good example of devel-
oping HSI requirements at the program and project level can be found in the 
development of NPR 7123.1B and the latest update of the NASA Systems 
Engineering Handbook, SP-6105.
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Complex systems, regardless of whether they are flight systems, wind 
tunnels, thermal vacuum chambers, or security systems, must be designed 
with human operation in mind. Formulating Agency-level policy will pro-
vide a uniform implementation of HSI within all programs and projects 
within the Agency.
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The NASA Human System  
Risk Mitigation Cycle:  
Standards to Requirements to Deliverables
David R. Francisco, PhD
Abstract: With over 50 years of human space flight experience, NASA has 
gathered medical, environmental, and research evidence to assess the effects 
of the hazards of space flight on the human body. Historically, NASA uti-
lized groups of subject matter experts to assess individual risks, but as mis-
sion complexities increased, it was realized that the traditional approach to 
assessing and researching the mitigations for the human risks of space flight 
were not adequate. In order to maximize the understanding of this evidence 
and mitigate these human system risks, a tailored methodology was devel-
oped to assess the space flight evidence and quantify the risks. A key require-
ment of this new approach was the ability to weigh the risks relative to each 
other so that effective tradeoffs can be made to ensure that an optimized set 
of medical capabilities are on each mission. This chapter describes the risk 
methodology implemented by NASA to assess the evidence regarding the 
effects of the hazards of space flight on astronauts and potential mitigations.
Keywords: human system risk assessment, hazards of space flight, evidence, 
performance, health, risk mitigations
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Introduction
With over 50 years of human space flight experience, NASA has gathered 
medical, environmental, and research evidence to assess the effects of the 
hazards of space flight on the human body. Even though NASA has been 
flying for nearly 60 years, there are fewer than 600 individuals that have 
flown in space, and this limited number of subjects makes it very challenging 
to fully characterize and understand the effect of the hazards of space flight 
on humans. Historically, NASA utilized groups of subject matter experts 
(SMEs) to assess individual risks, but as mission complexities increased, it 
was realized that the traditional approach to assessing and researching the 
mitigations for the human risks of space flight was not adequate. In the con-
text of health, hazard is any source of danger to the health of the crew, and 
this implies a threat; a threat is a factor that can affect health status; and risk 
is an undesirable health outcome with an increased probability of morbidity 
and/or mortality. The confluence of hazards and threats equal risk.
In order to maximize the understanding of this evidence and to miti-
gate these human system risks, a tailored methodology was developed to 
assess the space flight evidence and quantify the risks. A key requirement 
of this new approach was the ability to weigh the risks relative to each other 
so that effective tradeoffs could be made to ensure that an optimized set of 
medical capabilities were on the mission. It was also imperative to ensure that 
research related to mitigating these risks was especially focused on risks with 
the highest consequence and likelihood of occurrence. This process needs to 
include understanding the hazards of space flight and gathering, assessing, 
and correlating evidence to better predict the probability of the event occur-
ring and the consequence of the event on human health and productivity. 
This strategy also includes standardized assessment of space flight human 
system risks and development of human space flight medical standards and 
requirements for spacecraft vehicle developers to ensure that the best possible 
risk mitigations are in place, while utilizing minimal resources. In order to 
implement this process, a cross-discipline board, the Human System Risk 
Board (HSRB), was formed that includes SMEs in the fields of Medical 
Operations (flight surgeons and biomedical operations), Occupational 
Health, Research/Science, Environmental Sciences, Epidemiology, and 
Safety Mission Assurance and Engineering.
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Human System Risk Board
The HSRB is the NASA Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) 
control board that implements and maintains a consistent, integrated pro-
cess for assessing and managing the Office of the Chief Health and Medical 
Officer (OCHMO) human system risks.
The HSRB:
1. Identifies and analyzes human system risks and concerns; 
2. Endorses cross-program, multidisciplinary action plans to mitigate 
risks and understand concerns;
3. Tracks the overall progress of the action plans developed and imple-
mented by the programs (funding entities); 
4. Determines risk dispositions (“mitigated with existing countermea-
sures” or “requires additional countermeasures for mitigation”) to iden-
tify forward work and to ultimately establish a risk posture per Design 
Reference Mission (DRM) characteristics;
5. Reviews and approves risk-related topics entailing updates to NASA 
Standard 3001 volumes, transition to operations technologies, and 
other potential issues that may change an already established risk 
posture; 
6. Establishes HMTA positions for technical items required for future 
programs; and
7. Disseminates risk status and the latest human system risk knowledge 
to human space flight programs, other NASA organizations at Johnson 
Space Center (JSC), Headquarters (HQ), other centers, and to other 
stakeholders to review all human system risks, establish a comprehen-
sive risk management and configuration management plan, and enable 
medical and research data sharing. These major developments of stan-
dards, the HRP, the HMTA, and a forum for review of human system 
risks, Human System Risk Board (HSRB) facilitated the integration of 
human research, medical operations, systems engineering, and many 
other disciplines in the comprehensive review of human system risks.
The HSRB assesses human system risks based on five main hazards that 
challenge the health and performance of flight crews during space missions: 
Altered Gravity, Radiation, Isolation, Hostile/Closed Environment, and 
Distance from Earth. 
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Hazards of Space Flight (Hazard + Threat = Risk)
Risks associated with human space flight are influenced by a variety of factors 
including vehicle design, distance from Earth—which drives the required 
medical capabilities—behavioral health due to isolation (affected by mission 
duration, vehicle design, and distance from Earth), the gravity environment 
during habitation/transit, gravity transitions during landing and takeoff, and 
the radiation environment. These hazards, coupled with the duration of the 
mission, drive the human risk for each mission. For this tailored methodol-
ogy, six design reference missions were developed to encompass the majority 
of space flight missions that NASA is considering. These design reference 
missions were chosen because of “natural” breakpoints of the hazards that 
affect human risks. These natural breakpoints factored the changes in radia-
tion environment from low Earth orbit (protection of the Van Allen Belts) 
to deep space radiation galactic cosmic rays (GCRs), duration for return to 
Earth which drives the amount of medical care capabilities on the vehicles, 
gravity environment and factors required for vehicle design (especially envi-
ronmental system/life support). Table 7.1 provides an overview of DRMs 
and space flight hazards.
Evidence-based assessments are performed for six design reference mis-
sions: (1) low Earth orbit, (2) six and 12 months, (3) deep space sorties (30 
days), (4) lunar habitation for one year, (5) deep space habitation for one year, 
and (6) planetary/celestial body transit and habitation for three years. 
Evidence Assessment
Evidence is gathered from numerous sources to understand the effects of 
space flight hazards on humans. These sources include (1) astronaut medi-
cal, research, and occupational data with space flight exposures; (2) space 
flight environmental and operational data; and (3) terrestrial medical and 
research data, including analogs and ground-based research. Outcomes 
based on the space flight human data must be correlated with the environ-
mental and operational data acquired from existing missions, and then it 
must be extrapolated to future missions with different conditions. This envi-
ronmental data includes such factors as carbon dioxide levels on the vehicle, 
radiation levels, duration in microgravity, and exposures and acoustic levels 
during the mission. 
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For example, the radiation assessment evidence is gathered from terres-
trial radiation accidents and animal models and is interpreted and extrap-
olated to the space environment to predict the consequence to humans 
(Figure 7.1). This interpretation and extrapolation (space radiation has a 
different makeup from terrestrial gamma radiation) has large uncertainties 
which limit the ability to fully quantify the risk.
SPACE FLIGHT MEDICAL  
AND RESEARCH DATA
Medical and research data 
from previous missions and 
terrestrial-based analogs.
SPACE FLIGHT 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
OPERATIONAL DATA
Examples: CO2 levels, 
acoustic, landing loads, 
radiations levels.
TERRESTRIAL MEDICAL  
AND RESEARCH DATA
Related terrestrial  
incidence, treatment  
and research data.
Interpreted and extrapolated by subject 
matter experts and physicians to assess 
present and future missions.
Level of Evidence Determination
Risk Metric Generation
Figure 7.1. Evidence sources and interpretation.
Based on assessment of all evidence from all sources, 100 medical con-
ditions and outcomes were considered to be the most likely that need to be 
considered for mitigation during space flight. The probability of the event 
occurring and the severity of the outcome were considered by interpreting all 
levels of evidence and utilizing SME to extrapolate to future missions with 
different hazards. Refer to for a list of these medical conditions and outcomes 
in alphabetical order.
597: The NASA Human System Risk Mitigation Cycle: Standards to Requirements to Deliverables 
 1. Abdominal Injury
 2. Abdominal Wall Hernia
 3. Abnormal Uterine 
Bleeding
 4. Acute Arthritis
 5. Acute Cholecystitis/
Biliary Colic
 6. Acute Compartment 
Syndrome
 7. Acute Diverticulitis
 8. Acute Glaucoma
 9. Acute Pancreatitis
 10. Acute Prostatitis
 11. Acute Radiation 
Syndrome
 12. Acute Sinusitis
 13. Aerobic Capacity Loss
 14. Allergic Reaction (mild to 
moderate)
 15. Altitude Sickness/
Hypoxia
 16. Angina/Myocardial 
Infarction
 17. Anaphylaxis
 18. Ankle Sprain/Strain
 19. Anxiety
 20. Appendicitis
 21. Atrial Fibrillation/Flutter
 22. Back Injury
 23. Back Pain (SAS)*
 24. Barotrauma (sinus block)
 25. Behavioral Emergency
 26. Burns secondary to Fire
 27. Cardiogenic Shock 
secondary to Infarction
 28. Chest Injury
 29. Choking/Obstructed 
Airway
 30. CO2 Headache/ICP/ 
Cognitive
 31. Constipation (SAS)
 32. Decompression Sickness 
Secondaryto EVA
 33. Dental: Exposed Pulp, 
Caries, abscess, tooth 
filling/crown loss
 34. Depression
 35. Diarrhea
 36. Dust Exposure (Celestial)
 37. Elbow Dislocation
 38. Elbow Sprain/Strain
 39. Electric Shock Injury*
 40. Eye Abrasion (foreign 
body)
 41. Eye Chemical Burn
 42. Eye Corneal Ulcer
 43. Eye Infection
 44. Eye Penetration (foreign 
body)
 45. Finger Dislocation
 46. Fingernail Delamination 
(EVA)
 47. Gastroenteritis
 48. Head Injury
 49. Headache (Late, SAS)
 50. Hearing Loss*
 51. Hemorrhoids
 52. Herpes Zoster
 53. Hip Sprain/Strain
 54. Hip/Proximal Femur 
Fracture
 55. Hypertension
 56. Immune System 
Dysfunction/Illness
 57. Indigestion
 58. Influenza
 59. Insomnia
 60. Knee Sprain/Strain
 61. Landing Loads/Injuries
 62. Lower Extremity Stress 
Fracture
 63. Lumbar Spine Fracture
 64. Malnutrition
 65. Microbial-Host 
Interaction
 66. Medication Overdose/
Reaction
 67. Mouth Ulcer
 68. Muscle Atrophy
 69. Nasal Congestion (SAS)
 70. Nephrolithiasis (renal 
stone)
 71. Neurogenic Shock
 72. Nose bleed (SAS)
 73. Orthostatic Intolerance*
 74. Otitis Media/Externa
 75. Paresthesia
 76. Pharyngitis
 77. Respiratory Infection
 78. Retinal Detachment
 79. Seizures
 80. Sepsis
 81. Shoulder Dislocation
 82. Shoulder Sprain/Strain 
– EVA
 83. Skin Abrasion, laceration
 84. Skin Infection
 85. Skin Rash
 86. Small Bowel Obstruction
 87. Smoke Inhalation
 88. Space Motion Sickness/
Neurovestibular
 89. Stroke (CVA)
 90. Sunlight Exposure/
Sunburn*
 91. Sudden Cardiac Arrest
 92. Toxic Exposure: 
Ammonia+
 93. Traumatic Hypovolemic 
Shock
 94. Urinary Incontinence 
(SAS)
 95. Urinary Retention (SAS)
 96. Urinary Tract Infection
 97. Vaginal Yeast Infection
 98. VIIIP – Visual 
Impairment/Increased 
lntracranial Pressure
 99. Wrist Fracture
100. Wrist Sprain/Strain
Figure 7.2. The 100 considered space flight medical conditions and outcomes in 
alphabetical order. Conditions/risks listed with a red number are exacerbated or 
caused by the hazards of space flight and are detailed in Figure 7.3.
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Assessment of the One Hundred  
Medical Conditions and Outcomes
In order to assess all of the medical conditions, a standardized process was 
developed to ensure that each condition was assessed consistently and that 
results could be compared across all conditions. After the initial review, the 
conditions that were driven by the hazards of space flight were separated 
from the conditions that were just part of “being human.” This separation 
allowed for those conditions that were not exacerbated by space flight to be 
lumped together and mitigated through medical screening and the applica-
tion of traditional terrestrial medical care.
After the review, it was determined that 30 conditions/risks were exac-
erbated or caused by the hazards of space flight, and those conditions were 
assigned individual human space flight risks and were assessed in more 
detail. Refer to Figure 7.3 for a list of the conditions/risks driven/influenced 
by the hazards of space flight.
Likelihood and Consequence of a Risk
The process used to assess these risks utilizes likelihood of the event occur-
ring coupled with the consequence of the event. The assessment factors 
include all countermeasures to the risk that include three distinctive phases: 
(1) selection factors that can be assessed/modified pre-mission such as screen-
ing criteria, pre-flight treatment and training; (2) design factors such as dura-
tion, location, and countermeasures suite that can be implemented; and (3) 
post-flight treatment and reconditioning. See Figure 7.4 for a graphic of the 
generic types of factors for risk mitigation and a radiation example for the 
three phases of countermeasures.
The likelihood and consequence are considered with known counter-
measures implemented, and, if for some reason countermeasures cannot be 
implemented, the risk assessment is recalculated to reflect the actual coun-
termeasures being implemented. For example, the likelihood of renal stone 
formation goes up with less water consumption and higher bone loss, so if 
water consumption is limited, the likelihood would change and the risk pos-
ture would be reassessed.
617: The NASA Human System Risk Mitigation Cycle: Standards to Requirements to Deliverables 
ALTERED GRAVITY FIELD 
1. Spaceflight-induced intracranial 
hypertension/vision alterations
2. Renal stone formation 
3. Impaired control of spacecraft/associated 
systems and decreased mobility due 
to vestibular/sensorimotor alterations 
associated with space flight
4. Bone fracture due to space flight induced 
changes to bone 
5. Impaired performance due to reduced 
muscle mass, strength, and endurance
6. Reduced physical performance 
capabilities due to reduced aerobic 
capacity
7. Adverse health effects due to host–
microorganism interactions 
8. Urinary retention
9. Orthostatic intolerance during 
re-exposure to gravity 
10. Cardiac rhythm problems
11. Space adaptation back pain
RADIATION
1. Adverse health outcomes and 
performance decrements resulting from 
space radiation exposure (cancer, cardio, 
and CNS)
DISTANCE FROM EARTH
1. Adverse health outcomes and decrements 
in performance due to inflight medical 
conditions
2. Ineffective or toxic medications due to 
long term storage
ISOLATION 
1. Adverse cognitive or behavioral 
conditions and psychiatric disorders 
2. Performance and behavioral health 
decrements due to inadequate 
cooperation, coordination, 
communication, and psychosocial 
adaptation within a team
HOSTILE/CLOSED ENVIRONMENT–
SPACECRAFT DESIGN
1. Acute and chronic carbon dioxide 
exposure
2. Performance decrement and crew illness 
due to inadequate food and nutrition
3. Reduced crew performance and of 
injury due to inadequate human-system 
interaction
4. Injury from dynamic loads
5. Injury and compromised performance 
due to EVA operations
6. Adverse health and performance effects of 
celestial dust exposure
7. Adverse health event due to altered 
immune response
8. Reduced crew health and performance 
due to hypobaric hypoxia
9. Performance decrements and adverse 
health outcomes resulting from sleep loss, 
circadian desynchronization, and work 
overload
10. Decompression sickness
11. Toxic exposure
12. Hearing loss related to spaceflight
13. Injury from sunlight exposure
14. Crew health due to electrical shock
Figure 7.3. Thirty human system space flight risks that are influenced  
by the hazards of space flight beyond normal terrestrial standards.
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PRE-MISSION
GENERIC FACTORS
Screening criteria
Pre-flight treatment(s)
Pre-flight training
Flight assignments
 –Age, sex, psychological
IN-MISSION
GENERIC FACTORS
Mission duration
Mission location
 –LEO, BLEO
Countermeasures
POST-MISSION
GENERIC FACTORS
Reconditioning
Post mission screening
Occupational health
Care for astronauts
Duty/lifestyle constraints
Treatments
Determines/Reduces 
Total Risk Posture
Radiation Example
RADIATION FACTORS
Individual sensitivity– 
biomarkers*
Selection–age, sex
Model projection of risk
RADIATION FACTORS
Shielding
Mission duration
LEO vs. BLEO
Solar min vs. max
Operational planning
Risk assessment
Dosimetry
RADIATION FACTORS
Personalized cancer 
screening*
Cancer treatment
* In development
Figure 7.4. Factors that influence risk countermeasures.
Likelihood Assessment
The human risk assessment utilizes a 3 × 4 matrix that has three levels of 
likelihood and four levels of consequence (see Figure 7.5). The three likeli-
hood levels of the human risk occurring are: (1) Low, < 0.1%, which is for 
events that have a very low probability of occurring but the consequence may 
be significant; (2) Medium, > 0.1 and < 1%; or (3) High > 1.0%. One percent 
was chosen for the controlling likelihood based on the “1 percent rule,” often 
utilized in aviation, that limits the risk of medical incapacitation to less than 
1% in a given year. The likelihood is determined for both in-flight health 
and productivity and for long-term impacts (post-flight).
637: The NASA Human System Risk Mitigation Cycle: Standards to Requirements to Deliverables 
Consequence
Mission Health and 
Performance (OPS)
Consequence
Long Term Health  
(post mission) (LTH)
Death or permanently 
disabling injury to one or 
more crew (LOC)
OR
Severe reduction of perfor-
mance that results in loss 
of most mission objectives 
(LOM)
Hi
gh 1 x 4 2 x 4 3 x 4 Hi
gh
• Unknown and improb-
able return to baseline 
(requires drastic 
intervention surgery and 
therapy)
• Major impact on qual-
ity of life (permanent 
reduced function, 
premature death)
Significant injury, illness, 
or incapacitation—may 
affect personal safety
OR
Significant reduction in 
performance results in 
the loss of some mission 
objectives
M
ed
iu
m
1 x 3 2 x 3 3 x 3
M
ed
iu
m
• Return to near baseline 
requires extended 
medical intervention 
with known clinical 
methods, technologies 
(pharmaceuticals, etc.)
• Moderate impact on 
quality of life
Minor injury/illness that is 
self-limiting
OR
Minor impact to 
performance and 
operations—requires 
additional resources (time, 
consumables)
Lo
w 1 x 2 2 x 2 3 x 2 Lo
w
• Return to baseline 
values within 1 year 
with nominal interven-
tion (time, exercise, 
nutrition, lenses)
• Negligible effect on 
quality of life
Temporary discomfort
OR
Insignificant impact 
to performance and 
operations—no additional 
resources required
Ve
ry
 L
ow
1 x 1 2 x 1 3 x 1
Ve
ry
 L
ow
• Return to baseline 
values within 3 months 
with limited intervention
• No effect on the quality 
of life
CM = Countermeasure
LOC = Loss of Crew
LOM = Loss of Mission
Low
≤ 0.1%
Medium
< 1%
High
≥ 1.0%
Likelihood
Quality of Life is defined as 
impact on day-to-day physi-
cal and mental functional 
capability and/or lifetime loss 
of years.
Figure 7.5. Likelihood and consequence matrix for human system risk assessment.
Engineering, Life Sciences, and Health/Medicine Synergy in  
Aerospace Human Systems Integration: The Rosetta Stone Project
64
In-flight Health and Performance Consequence Definitions
Coupled with the likelihood calculation, in-flight health and performance 
consequence is divided into 4 categories: (1) very low, which is described as 
a temporary discomfort that does not impact performance; (2) low, which 
is described as a minor injury that is self-limiting, requiring minor medical 
intervention; (3) medium, which is a significant injury that has a significant 
reduction in performance and requires significant medical intervention; and 
(4) high, which is permanently disabling injury or death.
Long-Term Health Consequence Definitions
Long-term health consequence is also divided into four categories: (1) very 
low, which is described as having no effect on quality of life and the astronaut 
returns to baseline within three months post-flight with limited intervention 
such as an exercise program; (2) low, which is described as having negligible 
effect on quality of life, such as the astronaut returning to baseline values 
one year post-flight with nominal intervention such as nutrition or correc-
tive lenses, or such as bone mineral density returning to pre-flight values 
with nominal exercise and nutrition or correction of vision with lenses; (3) 
medium, which is described as having a moderate impact on the quality of 
life; and (4) the highest consequence category is classified as having a major 
impact on quality of life.
Summary
With an established methodology to assess the human risk of space flight, a 
comprehensive assessment has been made for all of the human risk referenced 
and is continuously updated based on emerging evidence. These risk assess-
ments are communicated to program managers, engineers, and researchers to 
enable present and future NASA human space flight missions.
65
8
The Integrated Medical Model:  
A Case Study in Communication
Marlei E. Walton, PhD, MSE, and Erik Antonsen, MD, PhD, MS
Abstract: One of the main challenges NASA faces is the communication 
difficulty of two disparate entities, engineers and human system experts 
in life sciences, with completely different backgrounds. A manifestation of 
NASA’s attempt to bridge that communication gap is the development of the 
Integrated Medical Model over the last decade. Engineers use probabilistic 
risk assessment models to inform their own risk analysis; the medical com-
munity as a part of human systems integration has worked to develop a tool 
that expresses medical risk in quantitative terms that are relatable to and 
interpretable by engineers. Cataloging the approach, the challenges in the 
development of this tool, and its subsequent implementation is the focus of 
this chapter.
Keywords: space flight risk communication, NASA hazard analysis, engi-
neering, medical, human systems integration, probabilistic risk assessment, 
integrated medical model 
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Introduction
NASA’s Engineering-centric History
NASA, because of its mission and history, has tended to be an insu-
lar organization dominated by traditional engineering. Because of 
the engineering problems associated with early space endeavors, the 
historical approach to solving problems has been that of engineer-
ing. Long duration space travel will require a different approach, one 
requiring wider participation of those with expertise in divergent, 
emerging, and evolving fields. NASA has only recently begun to 
recognize this insufficiency and to reach out to communities, both 
domestic and international, to gain expertise on how to remedy it.1
NASA has historically had a primary engineering focus dealing with 
the operation of aircraft and spacecraft; the science of flight; and the study, 
design, and manufacturing of machines capable of flight, leaving the human 
system risk as a secondary consideration. From early space flight through the 
current day, the assumption has been that NASA buys down the risk of fail-
ure of the human system through rigorous selection of individuals designed 
to minimize medical issues and optimize available capability in flight. The 
inherent assumption has been that risk of vehicle system malfunction far 
outweighs the risk of human system failure. As space flight increases in dura-
tion and distance from Earth, the validity of this assumption is repeatedly 
challenged and a formal quantitative merger of the medical assessment of 
risk with the engineering characterization becomes increasingly valuable. 
The implication of this re-evaluation is that, under current practices, the 
human system is not given due significance as part of systems integration in 
the risk trade space of NASA space flight, even decades after its founding. 
The importance of human systems integration (HSI) will only increase:
Exploratory missions with humans involve a high degree of human-
machine interaction. The human factor will become more important 
as the durations of missions into deep space with humans increase 
and as the spacecraft crew functions more autonomously, adapts to 
unexpected situations, and makes real-time decisions.2
1 “Safe Passage: Astronaut Care for Exploration Missions,” Washington, DC: National 
Academy Press, 2001.
2 Ibid.
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Medical Risk:  
A Component of Human Systems Integration
Medical risk as a component of the HSI problem has been addressed by 
other government agencies. While not a NASA-specific problem, NASA’s 
needs are unique and the approaches taken by other agencies require some 
tailoring. Identifying human system components and quantifying associated 
component risk are required to best assess risk correlated with HSI. The 
Department of Defense has identified the following seven HSI domains:
1. Human factors engineering
2. Personnel
3. Habitability
4. Manpower
5. Training
6. Safety and occupational health
7. Force protection and survivability
with the goal to “optimize total system performance and total ownership 
costs while ensuring that the system is designed, operated, and maintained 
to effectively provide the user with the ability to complete their mission”. 
Although not called out as a domain per se, medical risk is an overarching 
thread through many of the identified domains above and represents a key 
component for HSI associated with space flight.
The need for an approach to medical risk prediction has been recognized 
since the early 1990s; this need led to the current-day Integrated Medical 
Model (IMM). Medical risk, as with any other risk, is described by a set 
of three components: (1) scenarios—what events could occur, (2) likeli-
hood—how often can an event occur, and (3) consequence—what happens 
if the risk event occurs. NASA has used several risk prediction methodolo-
gies, including fault tree analysis (FTA), failure modes and effects analysis 
(FMEA), and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). During the Apollo era, 
the General Electric Company provided results of a NASA-commissioned 
PRA using an FTA approach; this study predicted a less than 5% chance that 
NASA would successfully land a man on the moon and return him to Earth. 
Following the release of this report, NASA’s approach to risk management 
shifted from PRA and focused instead on design-oriented techniques (e.g., 
FMEA, Critical Items List application), which continued for several decades. 
It was not until the 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger accident that NASA fully 
recognized the vital importance of employing a risk prediction strategy that 
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takes into account complex systems. Following this mishap, NASA began 
employing PRA strategy more prevalently, with a focus on risk prediction of 
Space Shuttle Program activities. Medical risk as a human system component 
of NASA’s PRA plan evolved over several years, moving from qualitative to 
quantitative prediction, as described in the following section.
Approach to Medical Risk Assessment
Acknowledging the importance of medical risk as a human system failure, 
in 1990 NASA assembled a Clinical Experts Seminar with extramural and 
NASA subject matter experts (SMEs) to discuss medical system risk for the 
planned Space Station Freedom, including prevention, diagnosis, treatment, 
and transport aspects of the Health Maintenance Facility (i.e., medical capa-
bilities) for long-term space flight. Potential medical scenarios were discussed 
along with Classes of Illness definitions, Medical Operations ground net-
work, and medical risk in the context of different crew return capabilities. 
Results from the Seminar included the recognition that
1. accurate prediction of medical risk was not possible, only estimates; 
2. extrapolations of epidemiological data could be misleading with a mis-
match of population and/or illness reporting; 
3. capabilities, or lack thereof, could have significant impact on medical 
risk; and 
4. the training aspect for in-flight medical care should not be neglected. 
Shortly thereafter, a more quantitative approach was taken by employing 
a risk perception survey that was conducted by medical SMEs in 1993 to 
improve the characterization of medical risk during space flight. Recognizing 
the importance of predicting overall medical risk, the questionnaire was 
directed towards medical events where little to no space flight data existed. 
Incidence and perception of risk data were compared with analog popula-
tion, U.S. astronaut, and Soviet cosmonaut data to provide context for these 
results. These questionnaire results were combined with existing astronaut 
health data to establish a medical data set for medical risk decision support 
that included consideration of resource capabilities. 
In 1999, the International Space Station (ISS) Program pursued develop-
ment of a risk prediction PRA model quantifying safety-related risks, includ-
ing both engineering and medical risks. Although PRA at this time was 
already in use by NASA engineering to assess risk in other areas, the ISS PRA 
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model represented one of NASA’s first attempts to introduce medical risk as 
part of human systems integration with vehicle safety concerns. The medical 
data set developed above provided the basis for the ISS PRA model calcula-
tion of the probabilities associated with loss of crew life (LOCL) or consid-
eration of evacuation of a crewmember (EVAC), key end states of the ISS 
PRA model. The biggest flaw with this approach was that although medical 
risk was recognized as an important component of quantifying safety-related 
risks in the ISS PRA model, the medical data set used by the model was still 
based largely on SME opinion rather than a more quantifiable evidence-
based approach. 
What are we to do when the irresistible force of the need to offer 
clinical advice meets with the immovable object of flawed evidence? 
All we can do is our best: give the advice, but alert the advisees to the 
flaws in the evidence on which it is based.
A more evidence-based approach with quantification was needed to 
predict medical risk within the context of larger mission risk. The IMM 
became the quantified evidence-based solution (described below). When 
results from the IMM were initially compared with those from the ISS PRA 
model, the probabilities associated with LOCL and EVAC were higher by 
almost an order of magnitude (Figure 8.1). Given NASA’s lessons learned 
in prior human mishaps and almost two decades of engineering application 
of PRA, why had PRA methods not been applied to medical risk predic-
tion before this point? A central issue is the requirement to provide a valid 
process for understanding and interpreting medical evidence in the context 
of PRA-specific implementation to represent medical risk. The next sections 
describe several aspects of the technical challenges in implementation that 
led to this delay, and the unique HSI complexities posed in using tradition-
ally engineering-based methodology. 
Challenges and Implementation
Medical Risk Quantification Challenges
Assimilating the vast information needed to determine space flight medical 
risk presents an enormous challenge that led to the initial underestimation of 
the probability of key end states by SMEs. Accurate estimations of end state 
values require quality evidence-based data for the above three components of 
risk (i.e., scenarios, likelihood, and consequence). NASA collects model data 
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End state outcomes (EVAC = evacuation, LOCL = loss of crew life) from the ISS PRA model (8) 
are shown using medical data input from the Integrated Medical Model (IMM) and subject matter 
experts (ISS PRA).
Figure 8.1. EVAC and LOCL Probability Values:  
ISS PRA Model versus IMM Outcomes (2010).
needed to support evidence-based numbers for risk calculation in a variety of 
ways. A primary limitation in obtaining space flight and space flight analog 
data related to medical risk is that these data have not historically been kept 
in a single centralized location. Instead, they have been dispersed throughout 
the agency in various locations and under various oversight authorities. Even 
after their compilation, limited space flight data must still be merged with 
appropriate analog data, in a traceable manner, to create a requisite data set. 
Other difficulties to overcome in obtaining appropriate model data include 
levels of evidence (LOE) data interpretation and data translation into the 
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model, including the appropriate integration of direct space flight data from 
in-flight crew and use of more abundant, but potentially less-relevant, ter-
restrial (analog) population data.
As indicated above, required data sets for assessing space flight medical 
risk are not centralized or co-located; multiple sources need to be considered. 
This includes giving due consideration to all medical aspects required such 
that sufficient detail is captured to effectively describe risk for each medical 
condition. In the case of a medical event, several facets contributing to mis-
sion impact must be considered, including condition incidence, event severity, 
available diagnosis and treatment resources, and unique crewmember attri-
butes from individual past medical history. Integration of this medical event 
information with terrestrial analog data and unique space flight environmen-
tal factors further increases the challenge of estimating mission impact of a 
single medical event, let alone overall space flight medical risk due to all antic-
ipated medical events. In assessing medical risk, there is a range of effects that 
a single medical event could have on mission level risk estimates. For example, 
a single event of a small skin rash has a different mission impact than a cardiac 
arrest. For total mission medical risk assessment, characterization of multiple 
different types of medical events and the likelihood of successful diagno-
sis and treatment all contribute to mission-level quantifiable risk outcomes. 
These data need to be integrated through an evidence-based assessment of 
expected incidence, event severity scenarios, and availability of diagnostic and 
treatment resources of the different medical events culminating in predicted 
outcomes for mission medical risk as a whole. Each individual piece of medi-
cal condition data should only be used after careful consideration of space 
flight context (if available) as well as the context of terrestrial populations 
in similar analog environments (e.g., data from submarine crews, military 
personnel, or adventurists in extreme environments). Collating all of these 
data sets is necessary to adequately inform any space flight medical model, 
including the IMM; the quality of each of these data sets is also an important 
consideration in assessing overall human systems medical risk. 
Data quality assessment and translation are complicated but are neces-
sary to appropriately assess overall mission risk. Reference sources associated 
with a given data set can be characterized by using an LOE scale, where evi-
dence can range from so weak that it is hardly convincing to so strong that no 
one disputes its correctness. Determining proper context of each source asso-
ciated with space flight medical risk, which does not follow any typical LOE 
scale, required defining a new LOE scale (IMM LOE scale described below). 
Generally, data are deemed “high quality” if data are considered a good fit 
for their intended use. In considering HSI, human variability is unavoidable 
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and represents aleatory uncertainty associated with any piece of data in the 
prediction of human systems risk. The quality of data sets, however, may be 
due to a lack of knowledge, described by epistemic uncertainty, which can 
be reduced by gathering more data or increasing the evidence-based qual-
ity of the existing data to better match the astronaut population of interest. 
Incorporation of aleatory and epistemic uncertainties associated with each 
contributing medical data component added a new dimension of data trans-
lation complexity to the previous approach in quantifying medical risk where 
the resultant data were expressed primarily as point estimates. The impor-
tance of applying a quantitative framework while capturing uncertainty in 
all aspects of NASA PRA was emphatically stated by the NASA Return to 
Flight Task Group Final Report following the 2003 Space Shuttle Columbia 
accident (highlights added):
Further compounding the modeling challenge is the fact that the 
models most often used for debris assessment are deterministic, 
yielding point estimates, without incorporating any measure of 
uncertainty in the result. Methods exist to add probabilistic qualities 
to the deterministic results, but they require knowledge of the statistical 
distribution of the many variables affecting the outcome. Typically, the 
distributions of the “independent” variables would be derived from 
empirical observation. In the case of space flight, however, empiri-
cal evidence is often limited or non-existent, so theoretical or engi-
neering distributions must be substituted. The probabilistic analysis 
therefore is very dependent on the quality of the assumptions made by the 
developers. Although they evaluated some of the assumptions used 
by the model developers, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
(NESC) end-to-end “peer review” primarily analyzed whether the 
output of one model could be incorporated into the next, not the 
joint probability associated with any given output … without which 
it is difficult to know the reliability of the result. 
Probability distributions are analytic methods necessary when assess-
ing risk. Without an understanding of the likelihood of an outcome, risk 
acceptance is a judgment based on instinct and experience. But, as the 
Columbia accident showed, in a high-risk environment that involves 
many unknowns like human space flight, experience and instinct are 
poor substitutes for careful analysis of uncertainty. This requires that 
analytical models be used appropriately to inform decisions within a 
rigorous engineering process. 
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This represented an additional conceptual shift to the engineering 
application of PRA in their risk predictions, with a focus on understanding 
parameter uncertainty. In 2004, NASA’s medical community incorporated 
this same PRA strategy in their development of the IMM to better predict 
medical risk as a component of mission risk as a whole.
New Approach—Integrated Medical Model
Assessing engineering and medical data and risk to a similar level of granu-
larity and speaking the same risk language are critical, particularly when dis-
cussing the total risk posture of a mission and the trade space associated with 
mission execution. In 2004, conceptual development of the IMM using PRA 
methodology was initiated as NASA’s answer for translating medical data and 
information into risk language that was understandable to the engineering 
teams assessing vehicle and mission risk for the agency. An evidence-based 
approach was used to develop the IMM to ensure that model outputs were 
valid and that the IMM attained credibility as a risk decision support tool. 
The IMM uses stochastic processes via Monte Carlo methodology to simu-
late missions, which consists of three steps. First, input components, consist-
ing of core modeling information and scenario-specific parameters of mission 
and crewmember characteristics, are specified to define a particular mission 
profile. Next, the Monte Carlo simulation engine integrates the core and sce-
nario data; medical events, mitigations, and outcomes during the space flight 
mission are randomly generated based on the pre-defined input values and 
probability distributions. Finally, the output component depicts the results 
of the Monte Carlo analysis (with optional optimization of parameters), and 
total crew health and mission impact outcomes are summarized into quan-
tifiable metrics designed to support mission decision-making and scenario 
comparisons. Because PRA methodology was already in use by the NASA 
engineering community, conveying the Human Research Program (HRP) 
risk, defined as “the inability to adequately treat an ill or injured crewmem-
ber,” in the context of overall mission safety was effectively communicated 
to engineering teams using risk components that were already familiar. This 
communication between the IMM team and various engineering groups was 
an iterative process, and these sections under New Approach show the chal-
lenges and lessons learned of translating medical information, with its inher-
ent uncertainty, into quantifiable figures that engineers understand.
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Risk and Risk Components
Whether engineering or medical, risk components associated with PRA 
answer the following three basic questions:
1. Definition of Scenarios—What can go wrong?
2. Scenario Likelihood—How frequently does it happen?
3. Scenario Consequence—What are the consequences of it happening?
Before assessing “What can go wrong?” for a given mission, the design 
reference mission (DRM) itself needs to be defined. The engineering con-
cerns of mission duration and the number of extravehicular activities (EVAs) 
planned can both affect medical risk posture. Similarly, crew composition 
(number and sex of crew) and individual crew medical attributes (past medi-
cal history, such as dental crowns, contact lens use, coronary arterial cal-
cium scores [CAC], history of prior abdominal surgery, etc.) all contribute to 
the characterization of medical risk to the larger mission parameters. Once 
the DRM has been delineated, initiating events can be examined as part of 
the PRA Definition of Scenarios. For the IMM, this means determining 
potential medical conditions that could occur during the DRM using the 
IMM Medical Conditions List (IMCL) (Table 8.1). Medical conditions in 
the IMCL occur with a specified incidence and uncertainty. Thus, if a medi-
cal event occurs for a given medical condition, the likelihood will always fall 
within this quantified range. For each condition in the IMCL, an associated 
Scenario Likelihood is quantified, expressed either as an incidence rate or 
proportion (Table 8.1). The consequence of this event, however, can vary, 
depending on how an individual responds to the medical event. In the IMM, 
this follows a best-case or worst-case scenario (Figure 8.2) and is dependent 
on what resources are available to diagnose and treat the event. The event 
diagram in Figure 8.2 illustrates potential treatments and outcomes of a 
single medical event. Scenario Consequences are expressed as end states for 
each medical event that occurs during the DRM and include the following:
1. resources used to diagnose and treat the event,
2. probability of EVAC (pEVAC),
3. probability of LOCL (pLOCL), and
4. crew health index (CHI) calculated from functional impairments and 
durations during clinical diagnosis and treatment phases.
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Table 8.1. IMM risk components.
Definition of Scenarios Scenario Likelihood 
Quantification
Scenario Consequence 
Quantification
What can go wrong? How frequently does it 
happen?
What are the 
consequences?
IMCL Incidence End States
Medical condition event 1 Incidence 1
(medical condition 1)
pEVAC 1, pLOCL 1
(medical condition 1)
Medical condition event 2 Incidence 2
(medical condition 2)
pEVAC 2, pLOCL 2
(medical condition 2)
Medical condition event N Incidence n
(medical condition n)
pEVAC n, pLOCL n
(medical condition n)
Risk components associated with PRA techniques mapped to elements of the IMM;  
IMCL-IMM Medical Conditions List; N = number of events in DR
Untreated
Best-Case
Untreated
Worst-Case
Treated
Best-Case
Treated
Worst-Case
Best-Case 
Resources 
Available?
Worst-Case 
Resources 
Available?
Best-Case 
Scenario
Worst-Case 
Scenario
Partially Treated
Best-Case
Partially Treated
Worst-Case
All
All
Partial
Partial
None
None
Calculated End States:
Type and quantity of 
medical events organized 
by Medical Illness, 
Injury/Trauma, or 
Environmental categories
Resource utilization and 
depletion
Probability of consider-
ation of Evacuation 
(pEVAC)
Probability of Loss of 
Crew Life (pLOCL)
Crew Health Index (CHI)
Optimized medical 
resources (mass, volume, 
or end state risk) 
(optional )
MEDICAL 
EVENT
Figure 8.2. Medical event flow diagram for best- and worst-case scenarios,  
considering untreated-treated possibilities with end state outcomes. 
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End states common to both predictions of medical risk and engineering 
system risk are shown in Table 8.1. End states for the entire DRM are com-
bined, and if desired, medical resources (i.e., trade space) may be optimized 
by considering “What if?” scenarios to minimize risk or maximize crew 
health outcomes subject to risk priorities and/or resource constraints to gen-
erate new end states. Combined DRM Scenario Consequences are expressed 
as most likely values with uncertainty distributions and can be integrated 
directly with engineering results as a component of the prediction of overall 
system end state risk for a given DRM.
Given an event arising from a medical condition in the IMM database, 
potential progression pathways are shown for best-case and worst-case scenar-
ios. The best-case scenario is defined as a mild or moderate event requiring 
minimal or no treatment, typically resulting in more positive end states (i.e., 
lower resource utilization, pEVAC, pLOCL with higher CHI); the worst-
case scenario is defined as a severe event requiring more extensive treatment, 
typically resulting in less positive end states.
No Centralization or Co-location of Required Data Set
It is important to recognize that several data sets are needed to fully define 
the manifold risk components associated with quantifying medical risk pre-
diction. Consideration of multifactorial aspects in medicine also takes into 
consideration the huge diversity of the human system, which contributes to 
the aleatory (and overall) uncertainty of the model. A rigorous methodol-
ogy for co-locating information for each medical condition in the IMM was 
developed and translated into a standardized template, which later was devel-
oped into an integrated medical evidence database. Compiled information 
for each medical condition in the IMM is maintained in a controlled central-
ized database and includes citations of all source data references used for that 
given medical condition.
Levels of Evidence Data Interpretation 
As discussed above, determining proper context of each reference source 
associated with space flight medical risk, which does not follow any typical 
LOE scale, required defining a new LOE scale. Validity and credibility of the 
IMM are dependent upon the quality of the input data. Space flight missions 
involve a select astronaut population exposed to an extreme environment that 
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is isolated, remote, and constrained with limited medical resources, crew med-
ical skills and training, and access to definitive medical care. Therefore, infor-
mation obtained directly from the astronaut population in the space flight 
environment is the most relevant input data for the IMM and is assigned the 
highest level of evidence. The larger the biological deviation from the astro-
naut population, the greater the model uncertainty will be. Thus, informa-
tion obtained from terrestrial populations that are analogous to the astronaut 
population and/or the space flight environment still ranks highly in the LOE 
scale with decreased epistemic uncertainty in the IMM, as shown in Table 
8.2. as opposed to data from less comparable terrestrial populations. Given 
the deviation of the general population from the highly select astronaut popu-
lation, general population medical information is less relevant as input data 
for the IMM, introduces additional uncertainty, and subsequently is assigned 
a lower level of evidence (Table 8.2). Additional sources of IMM input data 
(e.g., input from external models, clinical practice guidelines, and SME opin-
ion) are also shown in the novel IMM space flight medical risk LOE scale 
(Table 8.2). While LOE values do not alter the way the IMM uses evidence 
from cited reference sources (i.e., higher or lower weighting of the data), LOE 
information is useful in providing appropriate context to IMM medical con-
ditions by indicating which medical conditions have a sufficiently credible 
evidence base versus those that are potential targets for additional research.
Table 8.2. IMM levels of evidence scale.
Evidence Level Evidence-based Source
1 Space Flight Data 
2 Anecdotal Space Flight Cases 
Space Flight Engineering Data 
Validated External Models
Terrestrial Data (appropriate analog or cohort, or Bayesian analysis)
ISS Medical Check List
3 External Models (not validated)
AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment
Clinical Practice Guidelines
Standards of Care
4 Terrestrial Data (no appropriate analog or cohort data)
5 SME Opinion
From IMM Approach to LOE (16)
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 Data Translation 
IMM input is comprised of source information as well as end user customer-
defined inputs specific to the desired mission to be simulated that the IMM 
integrates to perform probabilistic forecasts. The IMM utilizes applicable 
source data, which includes historical data, cohort data, and other appli-
cable medical data sources. For some medical conditions, due to the rela-
tive paucity of space flight medical information, Bayesian analysis methods 
are used with terrestrial analog data to develop estimates of the probabil-
ity, health effect, and mission impact of medical events during space flight. 
To the extent possible, all medical information is expressed with applicable 
uncertainty. Capturing and documenting multifactorial information and 
data assumptions help clarify the limitations of the IMM. The IMM Monte 
Carlo simulation component includes algorithms that integrate these source 
input data and crew mission specifications to generate the IMM output 
parameters. Each mission simulation runs multiple trials for a given set of 
parameters. Within each trial of the simulation, medical condition incidence 
values and likelihoods are sampled to estimate medical event occurrences 
for the simulated mission. Resource utilization and end states are tracked 
for each trial. When sufficient trials have been run for the specified mission 
parameters, a quantitative forecast of the mission and crew health impact is 
produced by examining the distribution of potential outcomes. To provide 
necessary context to these IMM results, assumptions and limitations of the 
model are provided with each IMM report; a summary of IMM assumptions 
and limitations is shown in Table 8.3.
Implementation
After addressing the challenges of translating medical information into quan-
tifiable data that could be modeled with results that engineers could under-
stand, development and testing of conceptual and programmed versions of 
the IMM could follow. IMM version 1 was a proof-of-concept prototype 
model version that forecasted mission outcomes for DRMs by applying the 
PRA modeling process. A formal conceptual model review was held with sig-
nificant interest from NASA stakeholder groups. Results from IMM version 
2 garnered particular attention from the ISS PRA engineering team, particu-
larly after demonstrating the difference in predictions of LOCL and EVAC 
probabilities using IMM input to the ISS PRA model versus using the prior 
developed medical data set as input (Figure 8.1). This led to formalization 
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Table 8.3. Summary of key IMM assumptions  
and limitations and correlating implications.
Simplifying Assumption, Limitations Implications
All diagnoses are 100% accurate. Medical resources used and quality time 
lost due to each medical condition may be 
underestimated.
All pharmaceuticals maintain 
maximum efficacy.
Medical resources used, quality time lost, 
and if applicable, loss of crew and evacuation 
end state outcomes due to each medical 
condition may be underestimated.
All medical events receive the 
appropriate treatment.
Medical resource used, quality time lost, 
and loss of crew and evacuation end state 
outcomes (if applicable) due to each medical 
condition may be underestimated.
All medical events respond to the 
treatment as expected terrestrially.
Medical resource used, quality time lost, 
and loss of crew and evacuation end state 
outcomes (if applicable) due to each medical 
condition may be underestimated.
All medical equipment is 100% 
reliable.
For conditions that use powered or 
calibrated medical equipment for diagnosis 
and treatment, quality time lost and if 
applicable, loss of crew and evacuation end 
state outcomes could be underestimated. 
When the status of a crewmember 
changes to EVAC, only one 
crewmember is evacuated.
This assumption may significantly 
underestimate quality time lost during 
the mission as compared to the real-world 
ISS where multiple crewmembers would 
be evacuated if one crewmember was 
experiencing a medical scenario requiring 
evacuation.
Most medical conditions, with 
exceptions including acute radiation 
syndrome and EVA-linked conditions, 
occur independently of the occurrence 
of mission events and other medical 
conditions. Currently, there is no 
correlation or association within 
or between crewmembers for most 
medical conditions.
The IMM does not currently model 
the association or correlation among 
crewmembers of either infectious diseases or 
an environmental condition (e.g., ammonia 
exposure); if included, quality time lost 
and resource utilization associated with 
correlating conditions would differ from 
their uncorrelated values.
(continued)
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Simplifying Assumption, Limitations Implications
The model assumes another 
crewmember is available to act as 
caregiver but does not track the time 
impact of providing this care.
This assumption may result in 
underestimating time lost from the mission 
compared to the real-world system.
Medical procedures are accurately 
followed and successful; no mistakes 
occur in executing medical procedures.
This assumption likely results in 
underestimating of resource utilization, 
quality time lost, and evacuation and loss of 
crew end state outcomes.
Crew medical skill level, and preflight 
and in-flight training, is not modeled.
Medical resources used and quality time 
lost due to each medical condition may be 
underestimated.
IMM assumes ISS power, potable 
water, and oxygen resources are always 
available in unlimited supply. 
Medical conditions requiring these limited 
vehicle resources may be treated more often 
in the IMM than in the real-world system, 
resulting in potentially underestimating 
quality time lost, evacuation and loss of crew 
life associated with these medical conditions.
Table 8.3 (continued)
of the IMM, including compilation of requisite model documentation and 
presentations to several NASA review boards, as a transition to operational 
use tool for medical risk decision support as part of human system integra-
tion into NASA’s engineering domain. Ongoing internal and external verifi-
cation and validation were carried out as part of process improvement during 
continued IMM development, culminating in a formal external review. A 
more mature version 4 of the IMM transitioned to operations in 2017 for 
continued support as a PRA decision support tool for a variety of space flight 
communities. The IMM has become an integral part of the engineering PRA 
teams at NASA, helping to inform medical risk assessments for the ISS and 
Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) Programs, as well as Commercial 
Crew Program (CCP) entities. 
Use of PRA techniques in both medical and engineering communities 
facilitated better communication between the two groups, improved under-
standing of the risks associated in each domain, and developed an enhanced 
appreciation of the assumptions behind the applied methodology (summa-
rized in Table 8.3). This was particularly helpful in interactions with the 
ISS PRA engineers, and these newly found understandings led to updates 
818: The Integrated Medical Model: A Case Study in Communication 
and refinements of both the engineering and medical models after the IMM 
transitioned to operational use. The following sections describe specific 
IMM applications with the engineers on the ISS PRA team and the MPCV 
Cross Program PRA team (XPRAT). 
ISS Program 
An intrinsic tenet of the IMM is its baseline to ISS medical capabilities and 
the ISS space flight environment; thus, the ISS Program was a logical start-
ing place to initiate discussions with ISS PRA engineers. Comparison of key 
mission risk predictions common to both engineering and medical groups 
with their underlying evidence base and assumptions and limitations led the 
ISS PRA team to recognize the immense efforts of the IMM team to estab-
lish quantitative results with a traceable high-quality pedigree. Comparison 
of IMM outputs of EVAC and LOCL probabilities to empirical historical 
space flight data and analog population data provided further validation that 
IMM outputs were reasonable estimates of the real-world system. In 2010, 
the IMM team was invited to participate in the then-ongoing evaluation of 
ISS return vehicle options, culminating in a presentation to the ISS Program 
Manager. During this presentation, directed questions about IMM results 
were possible because, as an Aerospace Engineer, these medical model results 
were communicated in terms familiar to an engineer. As an ISS Manager 
needing to understand criticality and priority of medical risk information, 
discussions led to further refinement of the IMM end state consequence of 
the probability of EVAC into emergent3 and non-emergent categories that 
are still a part of the IMM today. Further, having the same risk language 
enabled the IMM team to have a better understanding of engineering PRA 
results, leading to discussions between the medical and engineering groups 
regarding best model input data as well as potential for double counting risks 
between the two models. These considerations led to further collaboration 
between the two groups to use the extensive engineering expertise of the ISS 
PRA team in the realm of FTA of fire and toxic exposure of ammonia aboard 
the ISS to inform elements of IMM medical conditions associated with these 
environmental hazards. 
Thus, results from the Fire Model component of the ISS PRA safety 
model were used to more accurately update the IMM with respect to 
3 Emergent EVAC–evacuation required within 24 hours of the onset of the medical event.
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operational aspects of smoke inhalation, burns associated with fire, and 
ammonia toxicity, and the medical risk associated with these IMM medi-
cal conditions were backed out of the ISS PRA Fire Model to avoid “double 
booking” these risks. As another example, the importance of considering 
HSI in prioritizing vehicle consumable resources was shown when the ISS 
PRA engineers requested the IMM team to provide a quantitative assessment 
of supplemental medical oxygen use during six- and twelve-month ISS mis-
sions. IMM results were included as part of the decision support package to 
move oxygen resupply to the ISS to a higher priority. The alliance between 
the engineering ISS PRA and medical IMM teams is ongoing, with recurrent 
information exchange between the two groups and systematic updates to the 
ISS PRA model using IMM results.
Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Program
NASA’s Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) is required to 
provide medical risk evaluation to agency Programs while complying with 
several NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) including NPR 7120.11: 
NASA HTMA Implementation and NPR 8900: NASA Health and Medical 
Requirements for Human Space Exploration. The HMTA in combination 
with the MPCV XPRAT engineers called upon the IMM to provide MPCV 
medical kit information with engineering results from five other vehicle 
design PRA models to assess integrated MPCV mission risk mass and vol-
ume trades. The objectives of the MPCV Program are distinct from those 
of the ISS Program. Consequently, before implementing the IMM, DRM 
scenarios had to be scoped accordingly to best represent the MPCV system. 
IMM medical conditions were altered or removed due to the limited MPCV 
size, shorter mission duration, and absence of planned EVAs. Consultations 
among engineers from the XPRAT and ISS PRA teams with IMM team 
members led to adjusting ISS PRA Fire Model inputs to account for the sin-
gle-compartment MPCV versus the multi-module ISS, resulting in further 
IMM medical condition modifications to better simulate the MPCV DRMs. 
Once again, common PRA methodology and language with the ability to 
communicate and foster mutual understanding of model assumptions and 
limitations led to fruitful meetings with XPRAT engineers and IMM team 
members in discussing different optimization strategies for potential MPCV 
medical kits and the corresponding mass and volume trade space results from 
the IMM. 
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Initially, it was a surprise to the MPCV HTMA representative that 
IMM results indicated that the largest MPCV medical kit did not signifi-
cantly decrease medical risk when compared to the next smaller sized MPCV 
medical kit. When key assumptions were discussed, however (e.g., packaging 
was not considered as part of the IMM medical kit results), mass and volume 
medical kit trade space was able to be represented in the appropriate context, 
leading to acceptance of IMM results by the MPCV HTMA representa-
tive with appropriate communication to the MPCV Program manager. The 
IMM continues to contribute to the HTMA evidence-based, configuration-
managed process for informing the risk assessment that HTMA representa-
tives provide to the MPCV and other NASA Programs. 
Conclusion
HSI Trade in Risk Space and Risk Communication
The IMM has set a new bar for the expectations of information and data 
coming from the medical community, driving human system integration 
into a quantitative domain familiar to engineers. The global intent is not to 
minimize either medical or vehicle and technology risk alone; the goal is to 
minimize the system risk overall. Figure 8.3 shows a notional diagram illus-
trating a decrease in medical risk as mass and volume on the spacecraft are 
used to provide increasing medical capability. In a limited resource system, 
allocation of that space may decrease the medical risk while increasing non-
medical risk by taking up space that other systems may need. The resulting 
total system risk is the summation of medical and non-medical risk with a 
minimal risk point where the appropriate balance amongst system alloca-
tions is struck (indicated by the optimal medical system mass/volume point) 
and total mission risk is minimized (Figure 8.3, Total Risk line). This total 
mission minimum risk point will likely be shifted from where medical and 
non-medical risk lines intersect. This is because the slopes of the lines are 
likely not equal—meaning the amount of risk exchanged for either medical 
or engineering mass/volume is unlikely to be a linear function. While deter-
mining this risk point is an elusive concept to implement practically because 
of the uncertainties involved in risk quantification, the concept has value in 
principle in human and engineering systems trades. Excessive emphasis on 
any one system is likely to increase total mission risk. The most important 
thing for our crews is that we strive to identify the inflection point for total 
risk to achieve the lowest total mission risk possible, as shown in the notional 
risk analysis Figure 8.3.
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Figure 8.3. Notional mission risk analysis as a function of medical system mass 
and volume allocation. (From Notional Risk Analysis Trade Space.)
Mission total risk is shown as the summation (Total, in red) of medical 
(in brown) and non-medical (in blue) risk. As increasing medical capability 
is provided (shifting the mass and volume trade space towards increasing the 
onboard medical system), total risk decreases until the point “×” (minimum 
mission risk), after which risk from consuming the mass and volume non-
medical trade space adds more total risk than what is gained from increasing 
medical system mass and volume. The minimum mission risk point indicates 
where the optimal medical system mass and volume trade space occurs (gray 
vertical dotted line).
In any exploration endeavor, there is a tipping point where high risks of 
technological failure will give way to human system risks. For NASA, that 
critical juncture will be reached soon as mission length and distance from 
Earth both increase. Operations will be forced to change as current capabili-
ties for mission implementation become untenable. These include the lack of 
ability to use real-time communications with the crew for immediate prob-
lem solving or task monitoring, the lack of ability to evacuate crewmem-
bers if they become seriously ill or injured, and the lack of ability to provide 
resupply for consumable and perishable items such as food and pharmaceu-
ticals. The resulting operational paradigm change will face the challenge of 
overcoming establishment inertia, as NASA has been an engineering-centric 
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organization throughout its history. The medical community has risen to 
new challenges in attempting to quantify information to interface in a mean-
ingful way with the engineering domain. The IMM Project is an example 
of an ongoing conversation between medical and engineering worlds that 
makes strides to bridge the gap between training and discipline-approach 
differences. It is a crucial conversation that the agency must continue going 
forward. Having a reliable, quantitative approach to changing operational 
and mission needs will allow the agency to marshal the appropriate resources 
to minimize total mission risk in the best ways possible to serve our crews 
and our mission.
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The Human Systems  
Integration Practitioners Guide
Jennifer Rochlis, PhD, and Elton G. Witt, BS
Abstract: Over the past several years, NASA has been formalizing the 
approach to Human Systems Integration (HSI) and working to incorpo-
rate HSI into existing Systems Engineering (SE) processes. After updating 
many of our agency-level standards, requirements, and process documents 
to include HSI content, it was clear that a “user’s guide” would be of ben-
efit to encapsulate the philosophy and implementation of its principles. In 
2015, the HSI Practitioner’s Guide was released, with chapters covering the 
why, who, when, what, and how. It incorporates best practices and guid-
ance for conducting HSI with an agency-wide perspective and was written 
in concert with an inter-agency team of HSI experts. It is written primarily 
for the practitioner, but it also has guidance for managers and discipline 
experts. Following the NASA SE process, it provides phase-by-phase guid-
ance for activities and products, as well as skills-based tutorials and advice 
for scaling for HSI activities to any size program or project. Checklists for 
each SE milestone and a template for writing a program- or project-level HSI 
Plan is included, along with HSI case-studies, examples, and lessons learned. 
Since its release, it has been adopted by several projects, including the Multi-
Purpose Crew Vehicle Program—NASA’s next human-crewed spacecraft.  
Keywords: human systems integration, systems engineering, life-cycle costs, 
domains, practitioner
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Introduction 
What is Human Systems Integration?
Human Systems Integration (HSI) can be defined as an interdisciplinary 
and comprehensive management and technical process that focuses on the 
integration of human considerations into the system acquisition and develop-
ment processes to enhance human system design, reduce life-cycle ownership 
cost, and optimize total system performance. The human in HSI refers to all 
personnel involved with a given system, including users, operators, maintain-
ers, assemblers, ground support personnel, logistics suppliers, and personnel 
trainers. HSI embraces the concept of the human as a subsystem to be treated 
on par with hardware and software sub-systems. HSI identifies trade-offs 
across HSI domains and optimizes performance via both physical and non-
physical solutions. The end goal is all about capabilities: finding the right set 
of solutions to meet system objectives.
The Department of Defense (DoD) was the first to identify the need for 
better design processes for early and thorough consideration of the human 
element in systems design. They recognized that their unsustainable and 
escalating lifecycle system costs were due to unanticipated personnel train-
ing costs, user interface re-designs, logistics and maintenance expenses, sys-
tem down time, and repair costs necessary to keep systems operational. It 
became clear that better design practices for inclusion of the human elements 
required to develop, deploy, and operate a system were needed, and, in 2003, 
the DoD mandated that a “total system approach” must apply HSI to all 
acquisitions “to optimize total system performance (hardware, software, and 
human), operational effectiveness, and suitability, survivability, safety, and 
affordability.” The DoD states that the goal of HSI is “to optimize total sys-
tem performance and total ownership costs while ensuring that the system 
is designed, operated and maintained to effectively provide the user with the 
ability to complete their mission.” 
NASA has a well-rooted history of concern for the care and protection 
of their space flight crews and, as a result, has considered human health and 
performance in spacecraft and mission design for many years. However, it 
did have a formal acquisition mandate to include HSI activities in programs 
and projects until 2012, when updates were made to many of its govern-
ing documents such as the Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems, 
Space flight Human-System Standards, and Systems Engineering Processes 
and Requirements. 
Significant collaboration between stakeholders is required for successful 
HSI, and an “early and often” mantra is critical to infusing human concerns 
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into all lifecycle phases. Figure 9.1, based on a figure from the INCOSE 
Systems Engineering Handbook (2007), shows that lifecycle costs of a pro-
gram or project are “locked in” early on. The majority of lifecycle costs (85%) 
are determined by Phase B of the SE process, and, as time goes on, the cost 
to make design changes increases to factors of 1,000 times the original design 
costs. Early adoption of HSI will reduce overall risk and ensure that the 
system as designed validates its original intent for scope, performance, and 
mission goals. 
Time
0%
10%
20%
MCR SRR SDR PDR CDR SIR ORR DR/DRR
30%
40% 3–6×
45%
Concept
Design
Develop
Prod/Test
Operations 
through 
Disposal
75%
90%
100%
50%
20%
15%
8%
20–100×
500–1000×
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
C
u
m
u
la
ti
ve
 P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e 
L
if
e 
C
yc
le
 C
o
st
 a
g
a
in
st
 T
im
e
Co
mm
itte
d L
ife
  
Cy
cle
 Co
sts
% 
Co
mp
let
ed
  
(C
os
ts 
Ex
pe
nd
ed
)
Co
st 
to 
Ch
an
ge
 De
sig
n D
ire
cti
on
MCR Mission Concept Review CDR Critical Design Review
SRR System Requirements Review SIR System Integration Review
SDR System Definition Review ORR Operational Readiness Review
PDR Preliminary Design Review DR/DRR Decommissioning/Disposal Readiness Review
Adapted from INCOSE-TP-2003-002-04, 2015
Figure 9.1. Lifecycle costs are locked in early on in the life cycle. 
 Several myths exist around the topic of HSI. One is that the designers 
intuitively understand the human needs of the system because, after all, they 
are human. Designers who rely on their own internal human knowledge 
assume they know all that is needed about the people for whom their sys-
tem is designed, and such assumptions about human capabilities, individual 
variation, and how to accommodate for these parameters are at the core of 
many HSI failures. Another myth is that training is a cost-effective way to 
work around design shortcomings, whereas in truth, proper designs reduce 
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the needs for training. Using training as a stopgap measure to solve design 
problems results in higher operational costs in the development of courses, 
workarounds, and instructors. A third myth is that adding HSI to a program 
or project will cost money they do not have. This is a common misconcep-
tion, which focuses on immediate cost versus lifecycle cost. It is true that HSI 
inclusion during development may add some initial expense; however, proper 
application of HSI will result in meeting mission objectives and cost savings 
in the long run. In fact, early and continuous inclusion of HSI reduces total 
lifecycle cost, leading to significant reduction of operations costs.
How to Navigate the Practitioner’s Guide 
The Practitioner’s Guide is comprised of four chapters and four appendices. 
Similar to the previous section, the first chapter outlines “Why HSI” and 
includes the background and history of HSI, its key concepts, and defini-
tions of the HSI domains. It also contains a use-case table to assist the reader 
in using the guide whether he or she is knowledgeable in SE (but needs 
HSI training), knows human factors engineering (but needs SE and HSI 
training), is working as an HSI practitioner, or is a program or project man-
ager. The second chapter walks through the “Who” of HSI implementation 
and discusses the authority hierarchy, NASA documentation and required 
collaborations. The third chapter focuses on the “When” and “What” of 
performing HSI within the SE framework and provides a phase-by-phase 
walk-through of products and activities required for each phase. The final 
chapter presents the practical “How” components, such as getting organized, 
tailoring methods for different sized programs and projects, planning for 
HSI, and key skills for the practitioner. The appendices contain annotated 
outlines of an HSI plan, checklists for the integrator, examples of HSI imple-
mentation (with both positive and negative outcomes), and a list of resources. 
Throughout the guide, there are a series of explanatory “blue box” exam-
ples to help reinforce the content, provide short stories, examples, and addi-
tional context (see Figure 9.2).
HSI encompasses several domains, or functional areas, against which 
system trades, studies, and analyses are performed (see Figure 9.3). NASA’s 
domains were modified from the DoD framework and include Human 
Factors Engineering, Operations Resources, Safety, Habitability and 
Environment, Maintainability and Supportability, and Training. Functional 
implementation of HSI is based on regular and frequent communication, 
coordination, and integration across the domains providing human-systems 
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Emergency Lighting Case Study
During ISS development, a requirement for emergency lighting was 
established, intended to provide module exit “pathway” illumination 
during a power outage . The original fielded solution, Emergency Egress 
Lighting System (EELS), failed to take into account the extensive crew 
time required to change out the batteries required to keep the system 
operational. Plus there was extensive logistics for flying up batteries. 
After many “lost” crew hours, ISS reconsidered, and a second design iter-
ation produced a much more elegant, low-cost and low-impact solution: 
circular photo-luminescent (glow-in-the-dark) markers, the Emergency 
Egress Guidance System (EEGS).
In this case study, crew man-hours is used as a cost-equivalent mea-
sure. The potential solutions in the second, “experience informed” itera-
tion considered the actual monetary cost of the battery logistics as well. 
All of the potential design solutions were compared to each other using 
both the cost- equivalent crew man-hours and the actual cost logistics 
metric. The selected solution is low-cost for both metrics.
Figure 9.2. “Blue Box” example on the Emergency Egress Lighting System.
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Figure 9.3. NASA HSI domain areas.
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expertise. Each HSI domain has the potential to affect and interact with 
the other domains, making it critical to execute an integrated discipline 
approach. Likewise, trade-off studies typically work to optimize solutions 
across domains and must include considerations for design solutions as well 
as non-design solutions. These “non-materiel” solutions, using the DoD 
term, can also be leveraged to close the capability gap in the form of train-
ing, procedures, personnel scheduling, etc. Appendix B contains a checklist 
with questions for consideration in each of the domain areas to ensure that 
all domains are addressed in the early development stages.
There are three key components of successfully implementing HSI. The 
first is having an HSI plan, the second is the HSI team, and the third is the 
use of metrics to track progress. The HSI plan is a “living” document that 
outlines the methods by which the program or project will ensure HSI is an 
integral part of the life cycle. Among other items, goals and deliverables for 
each phase of the life cycle are defined, as well as relevant methods, tools, 
requirements, processes, and standards. HSI issues, risks, and mitigation 
plans are also presented and maintained in the HSI plan. 
An HSI Team is comprised of stakeholders, domain experts, and the 
HSI practitioners. It should be created before the program or project is initi-
ated to help formulate the HSI plan, ensure the plan is implemented, and 
facilitate resolution of HSI-related issues during the life cycle. The team 
ensures the most effective, efficient, and affordable design possible through 
tradeoff studies within and between domains, disciplines, and/or systems. 
This is not an oversight role as much as it is a collaborative and integrative 
role, with team members engaging to help solve problems, identify needs for 
HSI-related domain expertise, and identify human-related cost drivers that 
could increase lifecycle costs or decrease system performance. 
HSI success relies on measurable outcomes. Metrics may include using 
checklists to track consideration of key HSI-related requirements, cost-equiv-
alent (i.e., crew time or efficiency) measures for task completion, and train-
ing time estimates. Conducting HSI domain trade-offs and identification of 
interactions with other major systems and subsystems can also be tracked.
Conclusion: Keys to a Successful HSI Practice
Programs and projects must acknowledge that the human is as important as 
other components of the system. To do this properly requires equal emphasis 
and resources to support HSI. Systems are composed of hardware, software, 
procedures, and the human, all of which operate within an environment. 
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When engineers and developers overlook human capabilities and limitations 
as part of the system design process, the mission goals are put at risk. Trades 
and analyses must include all personnel that interface with the system, all 
lifecycle phases, and all expected environments. HSI depends on integration 
and collaboration of the domain experts and stakeholders towards providing 
a common basis upon which to make informed decisions. HSI must be con-
sidered early and often throughout the design and requirements definition 
phases. Program managers, project managers, and systems engineers must 
take ownership of HSI and be held accountable for the outcome. The process 
must begin with a clear understanding of what the total system (hardware, 
software, and human) performance requirements are, as well as the mission 
attributes and goals. HSI requires being equipped with knowledge and tools 
on how to integrate human performance and capacities into research, design, 
development, and system implementation, coupled with an understanding of 
the NASA Systems Engineering Process. NASA is committed to formalizing 
HSI and providing HSI tools and guidance to all levels of the agency and 
organizations, towards a sustainable set of programs and projects that meet 
our nation’s exploration, and towards scientific discovery goals.  
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Building Cross-Cultural Bridges for  
Crew Health and Mission Success
Richard S. Williams, MD, MPH, and Charles R. Doarn, MBA
Abstract: The challenges facing effective human systems integration (HSI) 
and the consequences of HSI failure to NASA’s overall mission success are 
adequately documented. This manuscript provides examples of attempted 
use of cross-cultural risk analysis techniques and the use of a common lexi-
con to enhance communication between different communities of practice 
to improve HSI. In this final chapter, some of the HSI challenges and failures 
are summarized, and suggestions to reduce the risks to effective HSI, crew 
health, and success across all NASA missions are provided.
Keywords: medicine, engineering, complex systems, integration, human 
factors, HSI, conflict resolution, life sciences research
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Introduction
As it relates to human space flight, safe and effective system operations neces-
sitate a synergy between humans and machines, a union of two vastly differ-
ent systems in a highly and fully integrated final configuration. Biological 
systems and engineered systems (machines) each are impacted by similar and 
very diverse laws and challenges. Adaptation of biological systems occurs 
when the environment changes, whereas the “engineered” system is built to 
withstand the environmental changes. The differences between the biologic 
human system and engineered systems (machines) underlie the challenges 
confronting experts in human health and welfare, human factors, and system 
engineers. There are significant differences in the medical/life sciences and 
engineering communities of practice, beginning with the substrate on which 
each community works, continuing through professional lexicon, risk analy-
sis and identification, to risk remediation and problem resolution. 
Examples of Integration Considerations
1. Differences between living systems and mechanical systems: Biological 
systems are inherently diverse. Though similar and consistent at the 
molecular level, genetic expression drives vast differences between indi-
viduals in all species of life. In humans, these differences are expressed 
from unique appearance to disease susceptibility to cognitive and per-
ceptual processes. As an example, there are over 10 common anatomic 
configurations of the cystic artery (the blood supply to the gall blad-
der), and surgeons must be able to identify which configuration they 
are dealing with when removing a gall bladder. Differences in biology 
at the cellular and physiologic level are even more profound, driving 
relatively large parameters in dealing with and accommodating a broad 
spectrum of individuals. Emotional, cognitive, and behavioral health 
considerations also drive great variability in higher biologic systems, 
especially humans.
This “substrate variability” is usually of less concern in engineered 
systems, where there is a very high degree of consistency with materi-
als used in construction and few differences between units of pro-
duction (barring manufacturing tolerances and defects, and assembly 
and calibration tolerances). Parts are generally freely interchangeable 
between units in an engineered system, and those units should behave 
in a very consistent manner. These “substrate” differences affect the 
respective evidence bases supporting each community of practice and 
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affect the implementation of actual practice in each community as 
well. Conceptually, the differences between the engineering and life 
sciences communities can lead to misunderstanding and misinter-
pretation, which may lead to unintended consequences. It is highly 
advisable for these diverse communities to work closely together and 
understand the concepts of each field to avoid conflict and ensure the 
development of safe and effective systems to support the common 
stated programmatic goals. 
There is great complexity in the emergent interaction of compo-
nents in an engineered system, especially in those vehicles and systems 
that are small in number and unique (such as space flight systems and 
large wind tunnel facilities). Pilots and operators of complex systems 
commonly ascribe “personalities” (personification) to the air/space-
craft or systems they are operating, and note that one production unit 
may well have nuances and performance differences from another. For 
example, slight variations in manufacturing and assembly tolerances 
in a fleet of “identical” satellites result in longer training periods for 
operators and unique maneuver procedures for each vehicle. The com-
plexities that exist in the operations of engineered systems and medical 
evidence-based practice are in many ways similar, and they might be 
leveraged to find common ground between these seemingly disparate 
communities. 
2. Difference in research and development: Engineering systems design 
relies on rigorous assessment of resilience, sustainability, usabil-
ity, manufacturability, failure mode, and probabilistic risk to ensure 
safety, while biological research relies on repetitive observational or 
experimental protocols addressing single problems and identification 
of causal effects. Biomedical research inherently requires long lead-
time and is dependent on trial and error. Engineering and technology 
research is guided by a set of predetermined levels [phases] of readiness. 
The higher the level, the closer the system is to being ready for opera-
tional use. Biomedical research on the other hand tends to lag behind 
the engineering readiness level and, in many instances, is unable to pro-
vide critical design inputs into the engineering systems. This becomes a 
major source of frustration during tight schedules and budgets.
3. Differences in approach to fundamental practice: Engineers design 
their final products and use uniform materials and components to 
produce them. Understanding of an engineered system begins with 
an understanding of the materials used in the system, accounting for 
manufacturing tolerances, and continues through component parts 
Engineering, Life Sciences, and Health/Medicine Synergy in  
Aerospace Human Systems Integration: The Rosetta Stone Project
98
assembly and their interaction to produce consistent, desired behav-
iors and results. Experts in life sciences and medicine are presented a 
living system intact and must understand it in a retrograde fashion. 
It has taken centuries for humankind to progress from simple gross 
observation of living systems to an understanding of cellular physi-
ology and genetics. We are only now beginning to understand how 
living systems truly work, and our ability to impact and adjust those 
systems is still rudimentary. From the standpoint of testing and inves-
tigation, testing to destruction is accomplished with thoughtful delib-
eration and regularity in the engineering world. Testing to destruction 
is highly unethical in the medical world and is not done except at the 
cellular level (in cell cultures) and in certain lower animal models (at 
the protest of animal rights advocates). The practical implications are 
that the communities of practice of engineering and medicine/life sci-
ences approach their disciplines in opposing fashion, again contribut-
ing to profound challenges in understanding and cooperation. While 
biomedical engineering is a bridge discipline, it is more “engineering” 
centric and is limited in clinical and biological constructs.
4. Differences in risk analysis and assessment: The primary engineering 
risk analysis tool is probabilistic risk assessment, based on modeling 
and simulations. The evidence base for behavioral, health, and medical 
risk assessment is based on the epidemiology of health events in popu-
lations, which is difficult to apply to any individual due to biologic 
and cognitive variability. In addition, biological systems adapt to envi-
ronmental inputs and changes over time. These analytic techniques 
are both rigorous but very different, even to the lexicons supporting 
each of them. Understanding the evidence base that supports health 
and medical risk assessment, which drives system requirements, can be 
challenging to the engineering community. This can affect the appar-
ent conflicting inputs of health and medical requirements applied to 
human-operated systems.
5. The “Aeromedical Factor”: The aeromedical relationship (the relation-
ship between flight surgeons and the population served) is very dif-
ferent from any other clinical relationship in medicine. In the classic 
clinical relationship between physician and patient, both are working 
to remediate adverse health issues. The aeromedical relationship prop-
erly focuses on the health of crewmembers, but there is also a flight 
qualification element that crewmembers can perceive as a threat to 
continuing their flight careers. This dynamic stress between flight sur-
geon and crew has been active in every aeromedical certification system 
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for the past 100 years. It is mitigated by firm commitment on the part 
of flight surgeons to do all possible to preserve health and enable crew-
members to continue to fly, but the stigma remains nonetheless. This 
has probably had a negative overall effect in the relationship between 
flight medicine and the remainder of the aerospace development and 
operations community, further widening the communication gulf 
between the medical/life sciences and engineering communities.
6. Relationship between oversight authorities and program/project 
authorities: NASA has established technical authorities (engineering, 
safety and mission assurance, health and medical) to provide indepen-
dent technical oversight in the planning and execution of programs 
and projects. The technical authorities are less impacted by constraints 
due to cost and schedule and are meant to enhance safety and pro-
gram/project overall success. Dynamic tension exists between the tech-
nical authorities and program/project management, exacerbated in 
the case of health and medical technical authority by the differences 
discussed above. 
7. Organizational challenges to HSI: Human factors and health and 
medical programmatic requirements are handled differently in NASA 
between directorates and centers from an organizational standpoint. 
These organizational differences may lead to disconnects in under-
standing, accepting, resourcing, and complying with human systems 
integration requirements. Organizations and communication chains 
currently in use have not changed in decades, while the ability to 
design, build, and operate ever more complex, human-rated systems 
continues to improve. 
Recommendations
Cultural and practical bridges need to be built between the communities 
of practice responsible for the design, development, and operation of NASA 
systems. This must be done with a full awareness and appreciation of past 
evidence and experience. Cultural challenges have also been critical in inter-
national programs where medical systems, cultural norms, and constructs of 
peer-reviewed science have been vastly different. The efforts between NASA 
and its international partners, specifically the Soviets/Russians beginning in 
the early 1970s, have aptly demonstrated these challenges, and the engineers 
and life scientists moved forward with full knowledge of these differences 
and the sensitivities to those. Through the course of this manuscript, we have 
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identified potential misinterpretations and provided examples of improving 
communication and understanding between engineering and medical/life 
sciences communities. Definitive recommendations on accomplishing this 
are provided below:
1. Recognize the fact that deep cultural differences between communi-
ties of practice involved in NASA system development and operations 
exist. These cultural differences pose a risk to effective HSI.
2. Address cultural differences, primarily between engineering and medi-
cal/life sciences communities, early in the career paths of practitioners. 
Given the importance of human-rated and -operated systems, not 
just to NASA but across society, these differences should be formally 
addressed in the early training curricula of both engineering and medi-
cal/life sciences students in their respective professional schools. 
3. Adopt a common lexicon and common means of communication, 
methods, and practices that are recognizable and understandable by 
all, as effective communication is imperative. In NASA, the Technical 
Authorities and the Mission Directorates should collaborate to produce 
training modules in NASA’s learning management system—System for 
Administration, Training, and Educational Resources (SATERN)—to 
promote understanding of cultural differences and improve dynam-
ics and the working relationship between engineering and medical/
life sciences communities. NASA should also establish a mandate for 
the Technical Authorities to emphasize effective HSI and to mediate 
and translate between the medical/life science and engineering com-
munities. Medical/life sciences communities should leverage com-
munication techniques used widely in systems engineering as much 
as possible. Medical/life sciences communities should utilize engineer-
ing risk analysis techniques when feasible. Engineering communities 
would be well served to consider the ethical approaches defined earlier 
in this manuscript when considering overall risk assessment and accep-
tance. The field of human factors is critically important as common 
ground for the intersection of all communities of practice in HSI and 
can serve as an effective agent and venue for change.
4. Create an imperative that all members of these diverse and relevant 
communities work together in a common platform to ensure the 
health and safety of the crewmember and the entire system that sup-
ports them from design and construction to operation. The diversity 
of thought/perspectives from each of the relevant communities is a 
necessity in order to have successful systems, and as such, those diverse 
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contributions must be actively engaged, encouraged and respected. 
Such a paradigm is critical in human space flight as it enters a new 
phase of deep space and planetary exploration.
5. Recognize that dynamic tension exists between Technical Authorities 
and program/project management. This tension is healthy in the vast 
majority of cases and should be lauded for its value in enhancing safety 
and the overall project/program success. Technical Authority should be 
embraced, protected, and preserved in NASA.
6. Engage the National Academies of Engineering, Science, and Medicine 
to study and comment on the imperative of cross-community collab-
oration and communication in HSI. This study could be facilitated 
by the Committee on Aerospace Medicine and Medicine of Extreme 
Environments and the Board on Human System Integration.
7. Study the disparate ways in which human factors and HSI are orga-
nized and addressed throughout NASA. Disconnects between require-
ments “ownership” and workforce management from center to center 
and directorate to directorate might contribute to the HSI challenges 
currently faced. A multidisciplinary team to fully study organizational 
challenges to effective HSI and to recommend changes to address those 
challenges should be considered.
8. Inclusion of all responsible and relevant communities of practice in all 
phases of the project/program, from design to operations, is absolutely 
necessary. Inclusion of communities late, almost as an afterthought, 
has demonstrably untoward and sometimes tragic effects.
9. The ethics-based decision-making framework that has been imple-
mented for health and medical risks should also be considered for use 
in other risk acceptance paradigms. The same ethical principles and 
responsibilities could be applied to risk analysis, mitigation and accep-
tance in the safety and engineering realms as well. This would provide a 
broader context for risk decision-making and result in a stronger foun-
dation to support the acceptance of higher risk levels, particularly in 
situations where mitigation strategies are inadequate or not available. 
Incorporation of a formal role for ethical considerations in engineering 
and safety risk analysis and decision-making could ultimately result in 
more comprehensive mission planning and management.
10. Finally, stress the importance of organizational leadership in achieving 
successful HSI. Ultimately, effective HSI is clearly a leadership respon-
sibility. Communication and understanding between diverse commu-
nities of practice must be inculcated as an organizational core value, 
repeatedly emphasized by leadership as an imperative.
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Conclusion
In the realm of human behavior, recognition and understanding that a prob-
lem exists is the first step in remediating that problem. In this manuscript, 
we have recognized that perennial problems have plagued HSI and con-
tinue to in the most current systems development efforts. We have posited 
reasons for these problems, rooted for the most part in deep cultural dif-
ferences between the communities of practice responsible for human-rated 
systems design, development, and operations. We have described examples of 
cross-cultural collaboration and proposed positive steps that can be taken to 
address cultural differences with the long-term goal of enhancing HSI effec-
tiveness. We must achieve optimal HSI in the development and operations 
of all NASA systems, from basic research to space exploration systems, for 
mission success. On the ground, we have the luxury of stopping a test, with 
impact to budget and schedule. In flight, whether atmospheric or in deep 
space, we will not have that luxury.
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